Retirement-division case law

This case arose after a divorce. The dispute concerned retirement benefits. The ex-wife, Shari Severns, asked the district court to enter a QDRO - a Qualified Domestic Relations Order, which is a court order used to divide retirement or pension benefits between spouses - so she could receive her share of John Severns's retirement benefits. The district court granted that request. John Severns then tried to appeal. The Nevada Supreme Court, however, did not decide whether the lower court was right or wrong. Instead, it found that it had no authority to hear the appeal at all - what the law calls a "jurisdictional defect." The court explained two reasons. First, the June 12, 2026, "minute order" that Severns pointed to in his notice of appeal was not something that can be appealed. Under Nevada law, certain court orders must be written, signed, and filed before they take effect, and a minute order does not meet that requirement. Second, even treating the appeal as being from the later August 7, 2026, written order, that order still could not be appealed. The court reasoned that the August 7 order simply enforced an earlier July 2, 2026, order directing that each party receive their community property share of the other's pension through a QDRO. Because nothing in it qualified as an appealable "special order after final judgment," and because no other statute or rule allowed an appeal from it, the court concluded it lacked jurisdiction and dismissed the appeal.

Robert and Joanna Ronchi began dating in 2004. The day before their 2008 wedding in Pennsylvania, they signed a premarital agreement - a contract made before marriage that decides how property will be divided if the couple later divorces. The agreement said it would be governed by Pennsylvania law, listed each person's separate property (including Robert's interest in his business, Element 115, and his retirement accounts), and included provisions in which each spouse gave up any claim to property held in the other spouse's sole name. Joanna, a Polish citizen, was 19 weeks pregnant when she signed. The couple married the next day and moved to Nevada in 2010. In 2015, Robert bought a house, titled only in his name, that became the family home. Joanna filed for divorce in 2022. After hearings, the district court ruled the premarital agreement was valid. It then divided the couple's property, awarding Joanna half of the portion of Robert's Fidelity IRA that came from his wages during the marriage and half of the equity in the house, while confirming Robert's business interest as his separate property. The court later ordered Robert to pay Joanna $30,304 in attorney fees. Both sides appealed. The Nevada Court of Appeals resolved the appeal in four main parts. First, it upheld the ruling that the premarital agreement was valid. Because the agreement chose Pennsylvania law, the court applied Pennsylvania contract principles, under which signed agreements are presumed valid and a person challenging one must prove it invalid by clear and convincing evidence. The district court had found that Joanna generally understood the agreement's purpose, could read and write English at the time, and that both parties handwrote on the agreement, "I choose to waive representation by an attorney." The district court was not persuaded that her pregnancy and immigration status amounted to duress, and the Court of Appeals concluded those findings were supported by substantial evidence. Second, the Court of Appeals reversed the award to Joanna of half of the marriage-era contributions to Robert's Fidelity IRA. Although the agreement never specifically said Robert's wages would be his separate property, its plain language released each spouse's rights to "[a]ny and all rights to any property of the other party titled in the other parties' sole name, whether before or after the marriage." Because the IRA was solely in Robert's name, the court held it remained his separate property even though marital wages went into it. For the same reason, the court reversed the ruling giving Robert a community interest in Joanna's own solely titled Fidelity IRA. Third, on the house, the Court of Appeals held the district court applied the wrong legal framework. The district court had used Nevada's "gift presumption" caselaw - the idea that when a spouse signs over title, she is presumed to have gifted her interest - and found Joanna rebutted that presumption with evidence that the house was titled in Robert's name only because of her credit problems, was paid for from a joint account, and that Robert admitted in an audio recording he had promised to put her name on the house and still "owed" it to her. The appellate court said that under the premarital agreement's plain language, property titled in one spouse's name stayed separate, so the gift-presumption analysis was error. But it concluded the substance of Joanna's argument and the district court's findings pointed to a different doctrine: "constructive fraud" - a breach of the special duty of trust spouses owe each other, which can allow a court to impose a "constructive trust" recognizing that an asset is actually co-owned despite how it is titled, even where a premarital agreement exists. The court vacated the ruling on the house and sent the issue back for the district court to decide whether Joanna established constructive fraud giving rise to a constructive trust. Fourth, the court rejected Joanna's argument that she was entitled to a share of the increase in value of Robert's business, Element 115. The Pennsylvania statute she relied on excludes from marital property anything the parties excluded by valid agreement, and the business was listed as Robert's separate property in the agreement's financial disclosure. Finally, because part of the property division was reversed, the court vacated the $30,304 attorney fee award. The case now returns to the district court for further proceedings consistent with the order.

Steven Fisher and Beatriz Wing married in 2011 and divorced in October 2023. After the divorce decree was entered, Wing asked the court to reconsider, and the district court issued an amended decree that divided their shared (community) property unequally, awarded Wing monthly alimony (financial support paid after divorce), and awarded Wing attorney fees. Both sides appealed the first time. In that earlier appeal, the Court of Appeals upheld some of the district court's decisions and reversed others. Specifically, it agreed that a motorcycle and a life insurance policy were community property, and it upheld alimony of $1,200 per month for five years. But it reversed the court's classification of a retirement account (the NYL IRA) as community property because the findings were insufficient, reversed the court's finding that Fisher had "wasted" marital money, and vacated the attorney fee award because the court's explanation for reducing it did not hold together. The case went back to the district court to fix these issues. On remand, the district court again concluded that the NYL IRA was community property, found that the alimony was $1,200 per month for five years, and recalculated the attorney fees, awarding Wing $37,419.25 (paid partly in cash and partly by reducing Fisher's claim against the marital home). In this second appeal, Fisher raised several arguments. He said the court should have moved the case to a different county (a "change of venue"). The Court of Appeals explained that Lander County was the proper place because both people lived there when the case began and the property was there, and Fisher did not provide sworn statements showing that he or witnesses would be genuinely inconvenienced. Fisher also argued the NYL IRA should be his separate property because the money came from an account he opened in 2007, before the marriage. The court explained that property obtained during a marriage is presumed to be shared, and the spouse who claims it is separate must prove that with strong ("clear and convincing") evidence. Because Fisher did not provide records tracing the money in those accounts during the marriage, he did not meet that burden. Several other property arguments Fisher raised - about a lien on the home, the value of life insurance policies, Wing's Disney retirement account, and alleged stolen assets and forged checks - were rejected because he had not raised them in his first appeal, so they were outside the scope of the remand and could not be raised now. On alimony, the court said its earlier decision upholding the $1,200-per-month, five-year award had become the "law of the case" - a rule that, once decided on appeal, must be followed afterward - and Fisher gave no reason to depart from it. On attorney fees, Fisher argued the award was unfair because he was indigent. The court noted that although he filed paperwork seeking to proceed as a poor person, he also paid the filing fee, so the Nevada Supreme Court took no action on that request. The court found the district court had properly considered the required factors and the parties' income difference, and Fisher did not challenge those findings. Finally, Fisher argued the judge was biased. The court explained that disagreeing with a judge's rulings is generally not enough to show bias; a party must show the judge relied on outside information or showed deep-seated favoritism or antagonism making fair judgment impossible. Fisher did not make that showing. The Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's judgment.

Cherlyn and Robert Oshiro married in 1999 in Las Vegas. Robert had served in the military, including four years in the Vietnam War, and received a service-connected injury. Throughout the marriage, the couple lived in part on Robert's military disability benefits. After Cherlyn stopped working in 2007 following a car accident and Robert retired in 2013, the couple lived on Robert's military disability benefits and their combined Social Security benefits, with Cherlyn serving as Robert's primary caretaker as his disability worsened. Cherlyn filed for divorce in 2023. The parties resolved how to split their shared property on their own, leaving only the question of alimony - ongoing financial support paid from one ex-spouse to the other - for the trial judge. At the time of trial, Robert received $3,946.25 per month in military disability benefits and $2,071 per month in Social Security benefits; Cherlyn received $998 per month in Social Security benefits. Cherlyn asked for $3,400 per month. Robert argued the court could only look at the couple's Social Security benefits and proposed $536.50 per month. The district court awarded $2,000 per month. Robert appealed. His main argument was that a Nevada statute, NRS 125.165, forbids courts from dividing a veteran's military disability benefits when setting alimony, and that the statute also forbids courts from even considering those benefits in the calculation. He argued the $2,000 award - which would require him to hand over about 96.6 percent of his Social Security income - effectively divided his disability benefits in disguise. The Nevada Supreme Court rejected that reading. The court held that NRS 125.165 prohibits direct actions against the benefits themselves - attaching, levying, seizing, assigning, or dividing them - but does not prohibit a court from considering that those benefits exist and contribute to a divorcing veteran's overall financial picture. The court relied on the plain text of the statute, the legislative history (an earlier draft contained the word "consider" but the legislature deliberately removed it), and the rule that words in a list take meaning from their neighbors - here, all the prohibited verbs describe collection actions, not passive consideration. The court also distinguished two U.S. Supreme Court cases Robert cited, Mansell v. Mansell and Howell v. Howell, explaining that those cases involved community property division and waivers of military retirement pay, not alimony. The court noted that Howell expressly left state courts free to take a veteran's disability benefits into account when evaluating need for alimony, and that the overwhelming majority of state courts allow consideration of such benefits in alimony determinations. Reviewing the $2,000 award itself for abuse of discretion, the court found substantial evidence supported it - the trial court considered both spouses' financial conditions, earning capacities, ages, health, home contributions, and standard of living. The court acknowledged that the award came "just up to that line" because Robert would have to pay nearly all of his Social Security benefits to satisfy it, but observed that the district court did not order him to pay from his disability benefits. The court expressly reserved for another day the harder question of whether NRS 125.165 would invalidate an alimony award that could only be paid by drawing from military disability benefits.

Andrew Larson and Paulene Trautman entered a domestic partnership in 2016. In September 2022, Trautman filed to terminate the partnership. Larson responded by asking the court to divide what he considered shared property, focusing on a home on Bagnoli Court, and he brought a counterclaim against Trautman's parents, Janice and Paul Madrid, who were part-owners of that property. Larson claimed he had a community property interest in Trautman's share of the home. The case started going to trial, but after the first day, the parties went to a settlement conference and reached a deal. They read the terms of that deal into the court record. Under the agreement, each side would keep their own personal property, bank accounts, retirement accounts, and debts. Trautman and her parents would keep their interests in the Bagnoli home. Trautman would keep the pets and pay Larson $17,000 from her retirement account through a special court order (a QDRO - a qualified domestic relations order, which is a document used to divide retirement benefits). The agreement also said the decree would include broad waiver and release language. After the settlement, the parties could not agree on the exact wording of the final decree. Trautman's attorney submitted a proposed decree reflecting the terms read into the record. Larson refused to approve it or offer changes. The court adopted and entered the decree anyway, finding it matched the agreed terms. Trautman's lawyer then sent over a proposed QDRO, which Larson's attorney approved. Even so, Larson filed a motion to set aside the decree, arguing the terms did not match the agreement and that he had not yet received his money. His lawyer later withdrew, and Larson continued on his own. He filed a second motion to set aside, now claiming the settlement was unfair, that he wanted a larger share of the assets, and that he had learned "new, extremely material information" - specifically, that the Madrids had not actually paid toward the Bagnoli home and so (in his view) had no real ownership interest. He also argued he should get one of the dogs, pointing out that Trautman had called the dog an emotional support animal at trial but a "pet" in her deposition. The district court held a hearing and denied his motions. It found that, according to the settlement transcript, Larson had not objected to the fairness of the deal, had agreed to the terms, and had been fully questioned ("canvassed") by the settlement judge. It found nothing showing that the Madrids' financial role in the home was a reason Larson agreed to the settlement, and noted the information about the Madrids came from Trautman's deposition, which Larson already had before the settlement. The court also found Larson had accepted the $17,000 payment, and that his complaint about the timing of the payment was not a reason to undo the decree. The court characterized Larson's complaints as "buyer's remorse," which it found was not enough to set aside the decree. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed. It explained that a settlement agreement is a binding contract, that the parties had read an agreement into the record and reduced it to a written decree, and that the record supported the district court's findings. Because Larson knew or could have known the information he called "new" before settling, he could not show fraud or newly discovered evidence. Because he did not provide the appellate court with a transcript of the settlement hearing, the court presumed that the missing transcript supported the district court's decision. The court also rejected Larson's claims of judicial bias and his ineffective-assistance-of-counsel argument.