Retirement-division case law

This case arose after a divorce. The dispute concerned retirement benefits. The ex-wife, Shari Severns, asked the district court to enter a QDRO - a Qualified Domestic Relations Order, which is a court order used to divide retirement or pension benefits between spouses - so she could receive her share of John Severns's retirement benefits. The district court granted that request. John Severns then tried to appeal. The Nevada Supreme Court, however, did not decide whether the lower court was right or wrong. Instead, it found that it had no authority to hear the appeal at all - what the law calls a "jurisdictional defect." The court explained two reasons. First, the June 12, 2026, "minute order" that Severns pointed to in his notice of appeal was not something that can be appealed. Under Nevada law, certain court orders must be written, signed, and filed before they take effect, and a minute order does not meet that requirement. Second, even treating the appeal as being from the later August 7, 2026, written order, that order still could not be appealed. The court reasoned that the August 7 order simply enforced an earlier July 2, 2026, order directing that each party receive their community property share of the other's pension through a QDRO. Because nothing in it qualified as an appealable "special order after final judgment," and because no other statute or rule allowed an appeal from it, the court concluded it lacked jurisdiction and dismissed the appeal.

Robert and Joanna Ronchi began dating in 2004. The day before their 2008 wedding in Pennsylvania, they signed a premarital agreement - a contract made before marriage that decides how property will be divided if the couple later divorces. The agreement said it would be governed by Pennsylvania law, listed each person's separate property (including Robert's interest in his business, Element 115, and his retirement accounts), and included provisions in which each spouse gave up any claim to property held in the other spouse's sole name. Joanna, a Polish citizen, was 19 weeks pregnant when she signed. The couple married the next day and moved to Nevada in 2010. In 2015, Robert bought a house, titled only in his name, that became the family home. Joanna filed for divorce in 2022. After hearings, the district court ruled the premarital agreement was valid. It then divided the couple's property, awarding Joanna half of the portion of Robert's Fidelity IRA that came from his wages during the marriage and half of the equity in the house, while confirming Robert's business interest as his separate property. The court later ordered Robert to pay Joanna $30,304 in attorney fees. Both sides appealed. The Nevada Court of Appeals resolved the appeal in four main parts. First, it upheld the ruling that the premarital agreement was valid. Because the agreement chose Pennsylvania law, the court applied Pennsylvania contract principles, under which signed agreements are presumed valid and a person challenging one must prove it invalid by clear and convincing evidence. The district court had found that Joanna generally understood the agreement's purpose, could read and write English at the time, and that both parties handwrote on the agreement, "I choose to waive representation by an attorney." The district court was not persuaded that her pregnancy and immigration status amounted to duress, and the Court of Appeals concluded those findings were supported by substantial evidence. Second, the Court of Appeals reversed the award to Joanna of half of the marriage-era contributions to Robert's Fidelity IRA. Although the agreement never specifically said Robert's wages would be his separate property, its plain language released each spouse's rights to "[a]ny and all rights to any property of the other party titled in the other parties' sole name, whether before or after the marriage." Because the IRA was solely in Robert's name, the court held it remained his separate property even though marital wages went into it. For the same reason, the court reversed the ruling giving Robert a community interest in Joanna's own solely titled Fidelity IRA. Third, on the house, the Court of Appeals held the district court applied the wrong legal framework. The district court had used Nevada's "gift presumption" caselaw - the idea that when a spouse signs over title, she is presumed to have gifted her interest - and found Joanna rebutted that presumption with evidence that the house was titled in Robert's name only because of her credit problems, was paid for from a joint account, and that Robert admitted in an audio recording he had promised to put her name on the house and still "owed" it to her. The appellate court said that under the premarital agreement's plain language, property titled in one spouse's name stayed separate, so the gift-presumption analysis was error. But it concluded the substance of Joanna's argument and the district court's findings pointed to a different doctrine: "constructive fraud" - a breach of the special duty of trust spouses owe each other, which can allow a court to impose a "constructive trust" recognizing that an asset is actually co-owned despite how it is titled, even where a premarital agreement exists. The court vacated the ruling on the house and sent the issue back for the district court to decide whether Joanna established constructive fraud giving rise to a constructive trust. Fourth, the court rejected Joanna's argument that she was entitled to a share of the increase in value of Robert's business, Element 115. The Pennsylvania statute she relied on excludes from marital property anything the parties excluded by valid agreement, and the business was listed as Robert's separate property in the agreement's financial disclosure. Finally, because part of the property division was reversed, the court vacated the $30,304 attorney fee award. The case now returns to the district court for further proceedings consistent with the order.

Steven Fisher and Beatriz Wing married in 2011 and divorced in October 2023. After the divorce decree was entered, Wing asked the court to reconsider, and the district court issued an amended decree that divided their shared (community) property unequally, awarded Wing monthly alimony (financial support paid after divorce), and awarded Wing attorney fees. Both sides appealed the first time. In that earlier appeal, the Court of Appeals upheld some of the district court's decisions and reversed others. Specifically, it agreed that a motorcycle and a life insurance policy were community property, and it upheld alimony of $1,200 per month for five years. But it reversed the court's classification of a retirement account (the NYL IRA) as community property because the findings were insufficient, reversed the court's finding that Fisher had "wasted" marital money, and vacated the attorney fee award because the court's explanation for reducing it did not hold together. The case went back to the district court to fix these issues. On remand, the district court again concluded that the NYL IRA was community property, found that the alimony was $1,200 per month for five years, and recalculated the attorney fees, awarding Wing $37,419.25 (paid partly in cash and partly by reducing Fisher's claim against the marital home). In this second appeal, Fisher raised several arguments. He said the court should have moved the case to a different county (a "change of venue"). The Court of Appeals explained that Lander County was the proper place because both people lived there when the case began and the property was there, and Fisher did not provide sworn statements showing that he or witnesses would be genuinely inconvenienced. Fisher also argued the NYL IRA should be his separate property because the money came from an account he opened in 2007, before the marriage. The court explained that property obtained during a marriage is presumed to be shared, and the spouse who claims it is separate must prove that with strong ("clear and convincing") evidence. Because Fisher did not provide records tracing the money in those accounts during the marriage, he did not meet that burden. Several other property arguments Fisher raised - about a lien on the home, the value of life insurance policies, Wing's Disney retirement account, and alleged stolen assets and forged checks - were rejected because he had not raised them in his first appeal, so they were outside the scope of the remand and could not be raised now. On alimony, the court said its earlier decision upholding the $1,200-per-month, five-year award had become the "law of the case" - a rule that, once decided on appeal, must be followed afterward - and Fisher gave no reason to depart from it. On attorney fees, Fisher argued the award was unfair because he was indigent. The court noted that although he filed paperwork seeking to proceed as a poor person, he also paid the filing fee, so the Nevada Supreme Court took no action on that request. The court found the district court had properly considered the required factors and the parties' income difference, and Fisher did not challenge those findings. Finally, Fisher argued the judge was biased. The court explained that disagreeing with a judge's rulings is generally not enough to show bias; a party must show the judge relied on outside information or showed deep-seated favoritism or antagonism making fair judgment impossible. Fisher did not make that showing. The Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's judgment.

Cherlyn and Robert Oshiro married in 1999 in Las Vegas. Robert had served in the military, including four years in the Vietnam War, and received a service-connected injury. Throughout the marriage, the couple lived in part on Robert's military disability benefits. After Cherlyn stopped working in 2007 following a car accident and Robert retired in 2013, the couple lived on Robert's military disability benefits and their combined Social Security benefits, with Cherlyn serving as Robert's primary caretaker as his disability worsened. Cherlyn filed for divorce in 2023. The parties resolved how to split their shared property on their own, leaving only the question of alimony - ongoing financial support paid from one ex-spouse to the other - for the trial judge. At the time of trial, Robert received $3,946.25 per month in military disability benefits and $2,071 per month in Social Security benefits; Cherlyn received $998 per month in Social Security benefits. Cherlyn asked for $3,400 per month. Robert argued the court could only look at the couple's Social Security benefits and proposed $536.50 per month. The district court awarded $2,000 per month. Robert appealed. His main argument was that a Nevada statute, NRS 125.165, forbids courts from dividing a veteran's military disability benefits when setting alimony, and that the statute also forbids courts from even considering those benefits in the calculation. He argued the $2,000 award - which would require him to hand over about 96.6 percent of his Social Security income - effectively divided his disability benefits in disguise. The Nevada Supreme Court rejected that reading. The court held that NRS 125.165 prohibits direct actions against the benefits themselves - attaching, levying, seizing, assigning, or dividing them - but does not prohibit a court from considering that those benefits exist and contribute to a divorcing veteran's overall financial picture. The court relied on the plain text of the statute, the legislative history (an earlier draft contained the word "consider" but the legislature deliberately removed it), and the rule that words in a list take meaning from their neighbors - here, all the prohibited verbs describe collection actions, not passive consideration. The court also distinguished two U.S. Supreme Court cases Robert cited, Mansell v. Mansell and Howell v. Howell, explaining that those cases involved community property division and waivers of military retirement pay, not alimony. The court noted that Howell expressly left state courts free to take a veteran's disability benefits into account when evaluating need for alimony, and that the overwhelming majority of state courts allow consideration of such benefits in alimony determinations. Reviewing the $2,000 award itself for abuse of discretion, the court found substantial evidence supported it - the trial court considered both spouses' financial conditions, earning capacities, ages, health, home contributions, and standard of living. The court acknowledged that the award came "just up to that line" because Robert would have to pay nearly all of his Social Security benefits to satisfy it, but observed that the district court did not order him to pay from his disability benefits. The court expressly reserved for another day the harder question of whether NRS 125.165 would invalidate an alimony award that could only be paid by drawing from military disability benefits.

Andrew Larson and Paulene Trautman entered a domestic partnership in 2016. In September 2022, Trautman filed to terminate the partnership. Larson responded by asking the court to divide what he considered shared property, focusing on a home on Bagnoli Court, and he brought a counterclaim against Trautman's parents, Janice and Paul Madrid, who were part-owners of that property. Larson claimed he had a community property interest in Trautman's share of the home. The case started going to trial, but after the first day, the parties went to a settlement conference and reached a deal. They read the terms of that deal into the court record. Under the agreement, each side would keep their own personal property, bank accounts, retirement accounts, and debts. Trautman and her parents would keep their interests in the Bagnoli home. Trautman would keep the pets and pay Larson $17,000 from her retirement account through a special court order (a QDRO - a qualified domestic relations order, which is a document used to divide retirement benefits). The agreement also said the decree would include broad waiver and release language. After the settlement, the parties could not agree on the exact wording of the final decree. Trautman's attorney submitted a proposed decree reflecting the terms read into the record. Larson refused to approve it or offer changes. The court adopted and entered the decree anyway, finding it matched the agreed terms. Trautman's lawyer then sent over a proposed QDRO, which Larson's attorney approved. Even so, Larson filed a motion to set aside the decree, arguing the terms did not match the agreement and that he had not yet received his money. His lawyer later withdrew, and Larson continued on his own. He filed a second motion to set aside, now claiming the settlement was unfair, that he wanted a larger share of the assets, and that he had learned "new, extremely material information" - specifically, that the Madrids had not actually paid toward the Bagnoli home and so (in his view) had no real ownership interest. He also argued he should get one of the dogs, pointing out that Trautman had called the dog an emotional support animal at trial but a "pet" in her deposition. The district court held a hearing and denied his motions. It found that, according to the settlement transcript, Larson had not objected to the fairness of the deal, had agreed to the terms, and had been fully questioned ("canvassed") by the settlement judge. It found nothing showing that the Madrids' financial role in the home was a reason Larson agreed to the settlement, and noted the information about the Madrids came from Trautman's deposition, which Larson already had before the settlement. The court also found Larson had accepted the $17,000 payment, and that his complaint about the timing of the payment was not a reason to undo the decree. The court characterized Larson's complaints as "buyer's remorse," which it found was not enough to set aside the decree. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed. It explained that a settlement agreement is a binding contract, that the parties had read an agreement into the record and reduced it to a written decree, and that the record supported the district court's findings. Because Larson knew or could have known the information he called "new" before settling, he could not show fraud or newly discovered evidence. Because he did not provide the appellate court with a transcript of the settlement hearing, the court presumed that the missing transcript supported the district court's decision. The court also rejected Larson's claims of judicial bias and his ineffective-assistance-of-counsel argument.

Norman and Stamper married in 2014 and have three minor children. Stamper filed for divorce in 2023 and asked for primary physical custody of the children. Norman filed a counterclaim also seeking primary physical custody. Both parties initially had lawyers, but Norman's counsel withdrew, and Norman began representing himself (pro se, meaning without a lawyer). The couple negotiated a settlement outside of court. Stamper sent Norman a "global settlement offer" under which the parties would share joint physical and legal custody, Norman would pay $550 per month in child support, they would split the children's medical costs, the children would stay on Norman's health insurance, and Stamper would receive 35 percent of Norman's CalPERS retirement funds instead of alimony. The parties added a term about Stamper returning a set of diamond earrings, then signed the agreement and told the court they had settled. Before the settlement conference, Stamper mailed Norman an updated financial disclosure form (a document, called an FDF, that lists a person's income and finances) on August 23, 2023, but did not file a copy with the court. That form showed Stamper had been hired at a law firm and expected to make about $75,000 a year. Norman testified he received it on August 26. On August 28, Stamper emailed Norman a draft of the divorce decree that included both parties' income figures updated to reflect her new job. On August 29, the court held a settlement conference. Both parties confirmed they had settled and testified that they had enough time to consider the terms, understood they were giving up their right to a trial, believed the terms were fair, and believed the agreement was in the children's best interest. The court signed the decree, which listed gross monthly incomes of $7,374 for Stamper and $10,509.36 for Norman. Norman did not appeal the divorce decree. About six months later, on March 4, 2024, Norman filed a motion under NRCP 60(b)(3) — a rule that lets a court relieve a party from a judgment that resulted from fraud, misrepresentation, or misconduct by the opposing party. He argued Stamper had not timely filed her updated financial disclosure, that this information was material to his decision to settle, and that there was therefore no genuine "meeting of the minds" on child support, alimony, or the children's health insurance. He also argued the decree did not comply with an administrative rule requiring child support stipulations to list the guideline amount, and that opposing counsel's conduct violated his due process rights. The district court denied the motion. It found the motion was untimely because Norman knew about the alleged fraud before the settlement and the entry of the decree and did not seek relief quickly or file an appeal. The court also found that, even if timely, the motion would fail because Norman knew about Stamper's new job and income before he settled and relied on that information when he agreed. The court found his other arguments did not show fraud and would have been better raised in an appeal from the decree. On appeal, the Court of Appeals upheld the district court. The court noted that Norman's own sworn testimony showed he knew by August 26 that Stamper was making or expected to make at least $75,000 a year, and had her exact income figure on August 28 — the day before the settlement conference. Despite this, he agreed to pay $550 a month in child support and agreed to keep the children on his own health insurance without raising any concern with the court or filing an appeal. The court found nothing in the record showing he ever asked about Stamper's health insurance. As a result, these points did not justify setting aside the decree. The court declined to consider Norman's argument that he was forced into the settlement because his counsel abandoned him, because he had not raised that argument below in the way he framed it on appeal. The court also treated his remaining arguments (about the administrative child-support rule, whether Stamper's income was supported by the record, alleged child abuse, and temporary orders) as waived because he did not address on appeal the specific reasons the district court gave for rejecting them.

Amanda Marin tried to appeal a 2009 court decision that annulled her marriage and divided retirement benefits, along with several later orders the family court entered in her case. She filed her notice of appeal - the document that starts an appeal - on February 3, 2025. The Nevada Supreme Court explained that an appeal must be filed within a short window after the lower court's order is served (generally 30 days, plus 3 more days if served by mail). Because the orders Marin wanted to challenge were served years or many months before February 3, 2025, the deadline to appeal each of them had already passed. Without a timely notice of appeal, the Supreme Court has no power (no "jurisdiction") to review the case. The court also addressed two other categories of rulings Marin wanted reviewed. As to a 2012 stipulation and order in which rights under the retirement order were waived, the court said Marin was not "aggrieved" by it and therefore lacked standing - the legal right to challenge it on appeal. As to a September 24, 2019, set of district court minutes, the court said minutes of that kind are not the sort of order that can be appealed at all. The court also resolved several housekeeping motions: it granted Marin extra time to file her docketing statement; it denied her request to fix a clerical error in the district court case number (saying that request belongs in the district court); it denied as moot her request to proceed without paying fees because the filing fee had already been waived; and it denied her request to add the Nevada Public Employee's Retirement System, the Social Security Administration, the State of Nevada, and Elizabeth Giallanza as respondents, because they had not been properly made parties below and could not be substituted under the appellate rule governing deceased parties. Because of all of these problems, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal without reaching the merits of any of Marin's underlying complaints.

Hope Backman and Daniel Gelbman have a child together, born in 2013, and have been litigating child support for years. In 2019, Gelbman retired from firefighting at age 44 and started drawing a public retirement pension. He asked the court to lower his child support based on his reduced income. At a May 2020 hearing, the family court master concluded that Backman had not adequately documented her own earnings from her self-employed house-cleaning work, and the master "imputed" income to Backman equal to Gelbman's pension - meaning the master treated her as if she earned about $6,033 per month even though she may not have. Because the parents shared joint physical custody and were treated as having equal income, child support was set at zero. Backman filed several motions over the next few years to revisit child support, but each was denied and the zero-dollar order remained in place. In February 2023, she filed another motion, this time presenting documents showing she was earning roughly $600 to $800 per month from house cleaning, that the COVID-19 pandemic had affected her employment, and that she was behind on rent and car payments. A deputy district attorney at the hearing tried to explain to the master that Backman's documents showed a more than 20-percent drop in her income. Under Nevada law - specifically NRS 125B.145(4) - a 20-percent change in a parent's gross monthly income requires the court to review the child support order. The master cut the hearing short, said there had been no change in circumstances, and recommended leaving child support at zero. The district court agreed. The Court of Appeals reversed. The court answered two questions. First, when comparing income to determine whether there has been a 20-percent change, which prior order is the "controlling" one - the original order that actually calculated each parent's income, or any later orders that simply denied motions to modify without making new income findings? The court held that the controlling order is the most recent substantive order that set the support amount and made findings about each parent's income. Here, that was the May 2020 order, not the later denials. Second, what kind of evidence does a parent need to produce to trigger the mandatory review under NRS 125B.145(4)? The court held that the parent must present "prima facie evidence" - meaning credible evidence that, if accepted, would show the 20-percent change. Mere allegations are not enough, but a full trial-quality showing is not required at this threshold stage. Applying those rules, the court concluded that Backman's financial declaration, 2022 income information, profit-and-loss statement, supporting documents, and testimony that she was earning $600-$800 per month met the prima facie threshold and showed a more than 20-percent drop from the roughly $6,033 imputed to her in May 2020. The master was therefore required to conduct a substantive review - which would mean determining each parent's current income and applying the state's child support guidelines - and his refusal to do so was an abuse of discretion. The court sent the case back to the district court for that review. The court emphasized that requiring a review does not mean child support must actually be changed; it only means the court must look at the question on the merits. The Court of Appeals also explained what it was not deciding. It could not reconsider the May 2020 order itself, including the decision to impute income to Backman, because she did not appeal that order in time and did not list it in her notice of appeal.

Egan Walker and Laura Latimer divorced in 2002 after 13 years of marriage. During the marriage, Walker had worked as a deputy district attorney and earned about 8.54 years of credits in Nevada's Public Employees' Retirement System (PERS). As part of the divorce, the couple signed a marital settlement agreement that gave Latimer half of Walker's PERS retirement benefits accrued through June 1, 2001. To secure her share, the agreement called for a "qualified domestic relations order" (QDRO) - a court order recognized by retirement plans that directs how benefits are split. The QDRO required Walker to choose "Option 2" at retirement, which is a payment plan where the retiree gets a smaller monthly check during life so that, after death, a designated beneficiary continues receiving the same amount for life. After the divorce, Walker remarried, then later returned to public service as a court master and ultimately as a district court judge. When he became a judge, he had a one-time choice to keep his retirement benefits in PERS or move them into the Judicial Retirement System (JRS). He chose JRS and named his current wife as his beneficiary. Years later, when planning for retirement, Walker discovered that PERS and JRS had historically allowed only one person to be named as an Option 2 beneficiary. That created a problem: Latimer was contractually entitled to be an Option 2 beneficiary for her share, but Walker also wanted his current wife to be an Option 2 beneficiary for the rest. Walker asked the district court to sort it out. The district court agreed Walker could name both his ex-wife and current wife as Option 2 beneficiaries, but it also said Latimer was entitled only to 4.25 years of PERS credits and got nothing from the JRS account. The Nevada Supreme Court agreed with the district court that the relevant Nevada statute does not actually prohibit naming more than one Option 2 beneficiary. The court read the statute alongside other Nevada laws protecting a former spouse's interest in retirement benefits, and concluded that allowing two Option 2 beneficiaries best honors what the parties bargained for in the divorce: Latimer keeps her contracted-for share, and the current wife receives the rest. The court was not persuaded by PERS's arguments that federal tax law or actuarial complexity required a single-beneficiary rule. But the Supreme Court disagreed with the part of the order that gave Latimer credits in a PERS account that no longer exists. Because Walker had moved his PERS service credits into JRS, his old PERS account was closed, so awarding Latimer 4.25 years of credits in that closed account was, in the court's words, awarding her "a portion of nothing." The court held that when an ex-spouse has a protected interest in PERS retirement benefits and the member then transfers those benefits to JRS, the ex-spouse's interest follows the money into JRS. The case was sent back to the district court to fix that part of the order.

Steven and Brianna Pierce divorced in 2013 and share joint legal and physical custody of their child, O.P. Under the original divorce decree, Steven kept the child on his health insurance and paid Brianna monthly child support, with a discount (called a "deviation") to account for the cost of insuring O.P. In 2022, Steven asked the district court to review child support. Brianna filed her own motion asking for a review as well. The district court recalculated child support and lowered Steven's monthly obligation. It also concluded that Steven had been claiming a larger health insurance deduction than the court had authorized, meaning Brianna had effectively overpaid her share of O.P.'s health insurance for years. The court ordered Steven to repay Brianna nearly $6,500. Finally, the court awarded Brianna attorney fees because she prevailed on two issues. Steven appealed. The Nevada Supreme Court reached several conclusions. First, it said it could not consider Steven's arguments about the QDRO order because Steven did not file a notice of appeal from that order within the 30-day deadline. Appellate courts only review what the appellant actually appealed. Second, the Court agreed with Steven that the district court made a mathematical error in calculating both parents' gross monthly incomes. The district court used a daily rate of pay to extrapolate annual and monthly income, but Steven actually receives 26 paychecks per year (paid every two weeks) and Brianna receives 24 (paid twice a month). The Court held that approach overstated both incomes and produced an erroneous child support figure, so it reversed that portion and told the district court to redo the calculation using the parties' actual pay schedules. Because of this, the Court did not need to address Steven's other arguments about Brianna's hiring bonus, certain adjustments under the child support regulations, or whether Steven should be reimbursed for support he overpaid while the motions were pending. Third, the Court rejected Steven's claim that ordering him to repay Brianna for past health insurance overpayments amounted to a "retroactive modification" of child support, which Nevada law forbids. The Court reasoned that the district court was enforcing the existing decree, which required the parents to share O.P.'s health insurance costs equally. The Court also rejected Steven's due process argument, noting that Brianna had asked for reimbursement in her own filings, so Steven had notice and a chance to respond. That portion of the district court's order was affirmed. Finally, because the underlying child support ruling was being sent back for recalculation, the Court vacated the attorney fees award so the district court can reconsider it after redoing the support calculation.

Hope Backman and Daniel Gelbman have a child born in 2013 and have been fighting over child support since shortly afterward. From 2014 to 2019, Gelbman paid Backman between $731 and $858 per month. In 2019, Gelbman retired from firefighting at age 44 and asked the court to reduce his payments because his income had dropped by more than 20 percent. At a May 2020 hearing, Backman gave the family court master a required financial declaration, Venmo records from her house-cleaning work, and bank account screenshots. The master decided those records were not enough to figure out her income, so he "imputed" income to her - meaning he assigned her an income figure - equal to Gelbman's, and set child support at zero dollars. Over the next few years, Backman filed several motions asking the court to change the zero-dollar support order, citing things like the COVID-19 pandemic wiping out her work and Gelbman allegedly earning money from real estate and substitute teaching. Some of those motions lacked supporting documents, and all were denied; support stayed at zero. In February 2023, Backman tried again, this time saying she was unemployed, close to homelessness, and wanted to relocate. Before the hearing she submitted a financial statement, her 2022 income information, a 2022 profit-and-loss statement for her cleaning business, a text from her landlord about being behind on rent, a past-due auto loan notice, and a list of jobs she had applied to. At the hearing, when Backman tried to explain that she had lost her cleaning job, the master interrupted and said it was his turn to talk. A deputy district attorney tried to point out that her documents showed a more than 20 percent income drop since the last hearing, but the master interrupted again, said there was no change of circumstances, and ended the hearing. He then recommended denying her motion. The district court affirmed. The Court of Appeals agreed with Backman that the master got it wrong. Nevada law (NRS 125B.145(4)) says a change of 20 percent or more in a parent's income counts as a "changed circumstance" that requires the court to review the support order. The court explained the difference between reviewing an order and actually changing it: presenting evidence of a 20 percent income drop does not automatically lower or raise support, but it does require the master to actually look at the order and run the numbers under the proper guidelines. Because the master refused to conduct that review and made only conclusory findings, the appeals court reversed and sent the case back for proceedings consistent with its order. One thing the court did NOT do was review the original May 2020 order that imputed income to Backman. Because Backman did not name that order in her notice of appeal, the court said it could not review that order for abuse of discretion. But the court still used the May 2020 order as the baseline (the "controlling order") for measuring whether her income had changed by 20 percent.

Brian and Bryanna Ho were married for nearly seven years and had two young children. Both filed for divorce in October 2022, and their cases were combined. During the marriage, Bryanna stayed home to care for the children while Brian, a registered nurse, was the primary earner. The couple agreed on joint legal and physical custody of the children, so custody and child support were not part of this appeal. The appeal focused on two money issues: how the court divided the couple's property and how it calculated alimony (support payments from one former spouse to another). The first issue involved a Fidelity retirement account. During the marriage, Brian took out about $24,000 from that account (in two withdrawals of $12,500 and $17,500) and moved the money into the couple's joint Wells Fargo account. He testified he used the money to pay off shared credit card debt, and Bryanna did not dispute that. After the withdrawals, the account was worth roughly $2,486.31. The trial judge, however, found there was "no proof" of where the money went, called the withdrawals "unilateral and unsupported," and decided to treat the account as though it still held its pre-withdrawal value of $30,000 when dividing the property. To keep the split even, the court then shifted $10,686 of the marital home's equity from Brian to Bryanna. Notably, the same court also expressly found that neither spouse had committed "marital waste." The Court of Appeals held this was contradictory. If the court found no waste, then the withdrawn money was presumed spent for the benefit of the marriage (here, to pay off community debt). A community asset must be valued as of the date the divorce decree is entered - which was about $2,486.31, not the pre-withdrawal $30,000. By valuing the account at $30,000 without finding waste, the court effectively penalized Brian for waste it had said did not exist. The appellate court reversed this part and sent it back for a proper valuation and recalculation of the property division. The second issue was alimony. Bryanna asked for alimony so she could finish her education, explaining she had stayed home by agreement during the marriage. The trial court awarded her $1,650 per month for three years. In doing so, it decided Brian was capable of earning $12,680 per month - the monthly average from his 2022 tax return - even though his most recent 2023 financial disclosure showed a much lower gross monthly income of $7,271.16 plus small, occasional overtime. The court found Brian's explanation for why he stopped working overtime (the end of pandemic bonuses, more nurses hired, and his new custody schedule) not credible, and concluded he was reducing his income to lower his support obligations. The Court of Appeals agreed the trial court could award alimony and had properly analyzed the required statutory factors. But it found the *amount* was not supported by substantial evidence. The court had effectively added about $5,000 per month of "imputed" (assumed) income to Brian's figure without identifying how much of that was supposed to be overtime versus regular pay, and without evidence showing Brian could actually work that much overtime given the end of pandemic conditions and his new parenting duties. The appellate court also pointed out a factual mistake: the trial court described Brian's parenting time as a flexible "visitation" schedule, when in fact he had been awarded joint physical custody, which limited his availability to pick up extra shifts. Because the trial court did not properly account for Brian's changed circumstances or his actual ability to pay, the appellate court reversed the alimony amount and sent it back for reconsideration. Because it reversed the underlying rulings, the court also reversed the order requiring Brian to pay $4,245 of Bryanna's attorney fees.

Cherelyn and Timothy Harris-Bey had been married, divorced, and then remarried in December 2019. In June 2021, Cherelyn filed for divorce. The main disputes were how to divide the couple's property and whether Cherelyn should receive alimony (financial support paid by one former spouse to the other). After a trial, the district court entered a divorce decree in May 2023 that gave Timothy the couple's home, let each person keep the bank accounts in his or her own name, and ordered Timothy to pay Cherelyn $350 per month in alimony for six months. Cherelyn appealed. Cherelyn's first argument was that the court should not have given Timothy the marital home because his written response in the case (his counterclaim) had actually proposed giving the home to her. The appeals court explained that this proposed division no longer controlled the case, both because Cherelyn had denied that part of Timothy's counterclaim in her reply and because Timothy later said, about a year before trial, that he was no longer willing to give up the home. As a result, the case moved forward on general requests for relief from both sides, which the court said were enough to let the district court divide the property according to each person's interests. On the home itself, the appeals court agreed that Timothy had bought the house as his separate property in June 2019, between the couple's two marriages, and that the district court was entitled to believe his testimony over Cherelyn's (the district court found Cherelyn was not a credible witness, and appeals courts do not re-weigh credibility). But there was a problem: Timothy used money he earned during the second marriage (which counts as community property, meaning property owned jointly by the couple) to pay the mortgage. Under Nevada law, when community money is used to pay for separate property, the community earns a proportional ownership share. The district court never applied the required legal formula (from a case called *Malmquist*) to figure out that share, and it did not make adequate findings to justify giving the whole house to Timothy. So the appeals court reversed that part of the decree and sent it back for the district court to determine each party's interest in the home. Cherelyn also argued that the court wrongly failed to divide certain accounts Timothy had not disclosed: a cryptocurrency account, a thrift savings plan (TSP) account, and an account tied to a Mastercard. The appeals court upheld the district court here, because the district court found Timothy's explanations credible - that he never funded the cryptocurrency account, that he had emptied the TSP account (which had a zero balance) before the remarriage, and that he did not open or know about the Mastercard account. Because testimony counts as evidence and the appeals court does not reassess credibility, this part of the decree was affirmed. The appeals court reached a different result on a Navy Federal Credit Union (NFCU) bank account in Timothy's name. Both Timothy's employment earnings and Cherelyn's unemployment benefits were deposited into that account during the second marriage, making those funds community property. Once community funds were mixed into the account, the law presumes the entire account is community property, and Timothy offered nothing to rebut that. The district court gave the whole account to Timothy without stating any compelling reason for an unequal split, so the appeals court reversed that part and sent it back for a proper division. The court noted this conclusion was further supported by Timothy's failure to respond to Cherelyn's argument on this point in his brief. The court also directed the district court on remand to address a related question about a 2020 federal tax refund allegedly deposited into that account and a possible community debt from an overpayment of unemployment benefits. On alimony, the appeals court affirmed. The district court had made extensive findings under the statutory factors and concluded that $350 per month for six months was appropriate given the financial disparity between the parties, the short-term nature of the second marriage, and Cherelyn's failure to maintain viable employment even though she was able to work. Cherelyn's arguments failed either because she had not raised them in the trial court or because she had not shown the findings lacked support. Finally, the appeals court rejected Cherelyn's claim of judicial bias. Judges are presumed unbiased, and Cherelyn did not show the judge relied on outside knowledge or displayed the kind of deep-seated antagonism that would make a fair judgment impossible. The court therefore declined to order reassignment.

Tarik Hacham and Dounia Sebai married in 2011 and had two children. In 2020, during a period of marital strain, the family took an extended trip that ended in Morocco. There, after a heated argument, Tarik took Dounia's and the children's passports and refused to return them. Tarik filed for divorce in a Moroccan court, which denied his requests to bar the children from leaving Morocco and ordered him to return the passports or face a daily fine. He did neither. Dounia, meanwhile, filed for divorce in Nevada and obtained an emergency order allowing her to get temporary replacement passports; she returned to Las Vegas with the children. The Moroccan court later issued a divorce decree awarding Dounia primary custody. Back in the United States, Tarik at first lived in Arizona and, according to the opinion, exercised less than his agreed parenting time or none at all before moving to Las Vegas in September 2022. During the Nevada divorce case, a discovery commissioner found that most of Tarik's responses to Dounia's requests for financial information were inadequate and that he had not acted in good faith. The commissioner ordered him to fully comply by a deadline or face a "negative inference" penalty - meaning that any information he withheld would be treated as supporting Dounia's side of the case. The district court adopted that order without objection from either party. After a trial, the district court awarded the parties joint legal custody but gave Dounia primary physical custody, finding that the statutory "best interest of the child" factors were either neutral or favored her. The court also ordered the Moroccan apartment sold with the proceeds split equally, and ordered Tarik to pay Dounia an equalization payment of roughly $51,000 because about $102,000 of the $160,000 he had withdrawn from his 401(k) retirement account - money both sides agreed belonged to the marital community - could not be traced to legitimate community expenses. Throughout the case, the court repeatedly questioned Tarik's credibility, noting contradictory statements and testimony belied by documents in evidence. On appeal, the Court of Appeals rejected all three of Tarik's challenges. First, it refused to consider his argument that the Moroccan decree - which he claimed favored Dounia solely because she is the children's mother - violated his equal protection rights, because he never raised that argument in the district court and did not cogently argue it on appeal. In any event, the court concluded the custody decision rested on a comprehensive best-interest analysis in which the Moroccan decree was only one factor. Second, the court held the negative inference did not violate Tarik's due process rights, because he had specific notice at the discovery hearing that withheld information would be construed against him and had time to comply before the penalty took effect; and it held the district court properly treated the Moroccan apartment as community property, since Tarik's only support for his separate-property claim was a bare statement that he "bought a condo in 2008 prior to the marriage," with no documentation. Third, the court upheld the 401(k) ruling, because Tarik's evidence traced only about $57,000 of the $160,000 to community obligations, leaving roughly $102,000 unaccounted for. The court also held that Tarik waived his argument about the tax consequences of the 401(k) withdrawal by not raising it at trial.

Jeremy and Kelly Herrmann were married in 2007 and have two minor children. In April 2022, the district court entered a default divorce decree - a divorce judgment issued after Jeremy failed to participate in the proceedings. Later in 2022, Jeremy filed many motions asking the court to enforce the divorce decree or to hold Kelly in contempt, mostly over how property was divided and over property he said had been left out of the decree, including a Cummins engine and Kelly's pensions. At a November 2022 hearing, Kelly said Jeremy had a federal pension he had not disclosed before the divorce decree was entered, which Jeremy denied. In November 2022, the court resolved 31 of Jeremy's motions, ordering that several mistakenly omitted items be divided equally. The written order mentioned the Cummins engine but did not decide that issue. The court told both parties to file proof of their retirement accounts within 30 days, warning that any claims would be treated as given up if they did not. Jeremy did not file proof of his pension. In January 2023, the court entered an order awarding each party their own pension as separate property. Jeremy then filed a "motion to set aside default judgment," asking the court to undo the pension order, along with seven more motions about withheld, damaged, or omitted property, again including the Cummins engine. The court denied all but one of the motions, found Jeremy was filing piecemeal motions to harass Kelly, and ordered each party to keep any remaining community property in their possession except items specifically awarded to the other in the decree or a prior order. The court also, on its own, set a hearing to consider whether Jeremy should be declared a vexatious litigant. Jeremy appealed. The Court of Appeals ruled on three of Jeremy's challenges and declined to reach others. First, it upheld the denial of his request to undo the pension order, noting he had been given ample time to obtain his pension information but did not do so, did not ask for more time, and did not, on appeal, challenge that finding. Second, on the Cummins engine, the court explained that a party can ask a court to divide an asset mistakenly left out of a divorce decree within three years of discovering the mistake, but Jeremy did not point to evidence showing the engine was an omitted asset rather than part of a vehicle already awarded to Kelly. Third, the court rejected Jeremy's claim of judicial bias, finding he had not shown the bias came from outside the case or reflected the kind of deep-seated antagonism that would make fair judgment impossible. The court also dismissed the appeal to the extent Jeremy tried to appeal from the order merely setting a future vexatious litigant hearing, because no statute or court rule allows an appeal from such an order. Claims about child custody and other matters were not addressed because they related to earlier orders not timely appealed or were not raised below.

Irina and Donovan Hansen married in 2007 and have one child. During the marriage Donovan worked as a firefighter (later a battalion chief) for the city of North Las Vegas, while Irina initially worked as a real-estate agent, became a stay-at-home mother, and later obtained a cosmetology license and opened a salon using a home-equity loan. When the marriage broke down, Donovan filed for divorce in 2019. The case went to trial in 2021, where Donovan had a lawyer and Irina represented herself. The trial court divided the couple's property, set child support and alimony, and awarded joint legal custody with Irina having primary physical custody. Irina appealed, arguing the trial court got several financial issues wrong and was biased against her. The Court of Appeals of Nevada rejected each argument and affirmed (upheld) the trial court's decision. On child support, Irina argued the court used inaccurate figures for Donovan's income. The appeals court explained that trial judges decide disputed facts and weigh witness credibility, and appellate courts do not second-guess those calls when they are supported by adequate evidence. Donovan's pay stubs, tax documents, and testimony supported the court's finding that his gross monthly income was $15,376.19, which produced a child support order of $1,445 per month. On alimony, Irina wanted at least $6,000 per month rather than the $3,000 per month for 60 months she received. The appeals court noted trial courts have broad discretion to award alimony that is "just and equitable." The trial court found Irina could earn about $3,000 per month from her cosmetology work and salon, that her reasonable post-divorce expenses were about $5,500, and considered her child support - and concluded $3,000 per month for five years was appropriate. The appeals court found this supported by the evidence. On property division, Irina argued Donovan got an unequal share without proper findings, that she should have kept the marital home, and that Donovan wasted community assets. The appeals court explained that community property is generally split equally, that the trial court found much of Irina's testimony about asset values not credible, that selling the marital home made sense given the mortgage and home-equity loan on it, and that Irina had not proven waste. It also upheld the finding that money in Donovan's deferred compensation account before the marriage ($87,992.62) was his separate property. On the pension issue, Irina wanted to be named the survivor beneficiary on Donovan's PERS (Public Employees' Retirement System) benefits. The appeals court explained that under Nevada law a divorce decree does not have to give a former spouse a survivor beneficiary interest, and the trial court permissibly let Donovan choose his survivor beneficiary at retirement while still splitting the community interest in the pension equally. On attorney fees, Irina argued she should have received an amount matching what Donovan spent. The trial court noted both sides spent substantial sums, that some of Irina's spending reflected her "stated intent to drag this case out for her financial advantage," but that there was a significant income disparity, and awarded her $10,000. The appeals court found no abuse of discretion in declining to award more. Finally, on the bias claim, the appeals court held Irina had not shown the judge relied on information from outside the case or displayed the kind of "deep-seated favoritism or antagonism that would make fair judgment impossible" required to establish bias.

Troy and Monika Askew married in December 2006 and had one child, I.A., born in June 2009. Troy worked as a firefighter and had retirement and deferred compensation accounts; Monika ran a photography business but agreed to stay home with the child after I.A.'s birth. After a March 2020 incident in which Monika slapped Troy and Troy hit her back — with the child present — Monika was arrested and Troy obtained a temporary protective order. The parties later agreed to dissolve that order and shared temporary custody. Monika filed for divorce in March 2020. Several events shaped the case. In September 2020, Troy closed his deferred compensation account, withdrew its $98,672 balance, moved it to a separate account, and wired $65,000 to his mother — he later said $35,000 repaid a loan and $30,000 was for his mother "to hold for him." That same month, the child was hospitalized after expressing suicidal thoughts and told providers her mother had hit her. Monika admitted in the divorce proceedings that she once used a hanger to "swat" the child. Troy then sought another protective order on the child's behalf, but the court did not extend it because the application cited no new violence, only the earlier hanger incident. After a five-day trial, the district court entered a divorce decree in February 2022. On custody, the court found that both parents had committed domestic violence against each other in the March 2020 incident, but that Monika was the "primary physical aggressor," which triggered a legal presumption against giving her joint custody. A "presumption" here is a starting assumption the law makes that a party can overcome with enough evidence. The court examined the statutory "best interest of the child" factors, concluded the presumption had been overcome, and ordered joint physical custody with the child rotating three days at a time between each parent. On money, the court found that Troy's withdrawal from his deferred compensation account was a misappropriation of community funds meant to deprive Monika, which gave a "compelling reason" to divide property unequally. In the end, though, the court divided the community property equally: Monika received about $100,000 more in assets but was ordered to pay Troy roughly $50,010 as an offset to balance things out. The court also awarded Monika alimony of $800 per month for 72 months. The Court of Appeals affirmed on all three issues. On custody, it noted the district court did not separately label the hanger incident as an act of domestic violence against the child (which "was potentially an error"), but concluded any error was harmless because the court still applied the presumption against Monika, considered the hanger incident within its best-interest analysis, found it isolated and remote in time, and found the joint custody arrangement would protect the child. The appellate court also stressed that it does not reweigh evidence on appeal. On the property division, it explained that the court actually divided property equally after the offset, so Troy suffered no unequal treatment; and that although Troy was not formally served with the Joint Preliminary Injunction, he acknowledged and asked to be bound by it, so any lack of service was harmless. On alimony, the court found no abuse of discretion, holding that even if the district court compared Troy's gross income to Monika's net income, any such error was harmless and the required statutory factors were properly considered.

Richard Candelaria and Michael Kelly met in 1991 and began a long-term relationship. They moved in together that November, exchanged rings in July 1992, and lived together for years. But they could not legally marry in Nevada because, at the time, Nevada law and later the Nevada Constitution prohibited same-sex marriage. When California legalized same-sex marriage in 2008, the couple traveled there and formally married. In 2020, Michael filed for divorce. The fight in this case is about how to divide two assets: Michael's 401(k) retirement account (opened in 1984 with no contributions after 2008) and shares of stock he received through his job between 1996 and 2004. Under Nevada community property rules, assets acquired during marriage are generally split, but assets acquired before marriage stay with the spouse who owns them. So the question is: when did the marriage start? Michael said the marriage began in 2008, when they actually wed in California. Richard said the marriage should be treated as starting in November 1991 or July 1992, because they would have married then if Nevada had not unconstitutionally banned same-sex marriage. The district court sided with Michael and used 2008 as the marriage date, treating the 401(k) and stock as Michael's separate property. The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed. The court explained two related but distinct points. First, the U.S. Supreme Court's 2015 decision in Obergefell v. Hodges, which established that same-sex couples have the right to marry and that states must recognize same-sex marriages performed in other states, applies retroactively. So Nevada must recognize the couple's 2008 California marriage even though Nevada did not recognize such marriages in 2008. That part favored Richard, in the sense that the marriage is treated as valid from 2008 forward. Second, however, Obergefell does not require courts to pretend a marriage existed before a couple actually got married. Nevada does not recognize "common-law marriage" -- the idea that a couple who lives together long enough and acts married is legally married without a ceremony. A 1943 Nevada statute bans common-law marriage, and that ban applies to everyone regardless of sexual orientation. Richard asked the court to apply a multi-factor "but-for" test (borrowed from an Oregon case) to decide whether the couple would have married earlier had they been allowed to. The court concluded that doing so would amount to recognizing a common-law marriage, which Nevada law forbids. The court said it had no power to carve out a judicial exception to the statutory ban, especially since Richard did not argue that the ban itself was unconstitutional. The practical result: the marriage is dated from the 2008 California ceremony, and assets Michael acquired before then remain his separate property.

Milan Rupel and Theresa Galten married in 2001. In July 2017, Galten filed for divorce, raising only issues about how to divide the couple's debts and assets. The case went to a five-day bench trial (a trial decided by a judge rather than a jury) in 2019. After the original judge retired, a new judge entered a divorce decree in February 2021 that largely repeated the earlier findings. Both sides appealed. Several disputes were at the center of the case. First, Rupel had transferred $90,550 he inherited from his mother into a shared "community" bank account. At trial, both spouses agreed (stipulated) that this money had become community property - meaning property owned jointly by the marriage. But the district court instead labeled the transfer "marital waste" (spending or destroying marital money for a selfish purpose unrelated to the marriage) and awarded Galten half of that amount ($45,275) as a separate award. The Court of Appeals found this was a mistake: because the money was community property to be split evenly, giving Galten a separate $45,275 award and then also splitting the account meant she effectively received an extra $45,275. The court reversed that award and directed the district court to simply divide the account equally. Second, the couple disputed the value of an investment called the Kai-Zen Plan, a premium-financed retirement plan whose future value could only be estimated. Each side's financial expert gave a value - Galten's expert said about $405,531, Rupel's expert said about $143,714 (or $148,714, as also stated in the opinion). The district court instead used $554,902, a figure that came from a years-old projection on a trial exhibit that itself said the value was not guaranteed. The Court of Appeals held that relying on that outdated estimate was an error and sent the valuation back to the district court for more fact-finding. Third, there was a bank account in Galten's name that held $63,789.67 before the marriage. Community funds were later added to it. The district court found the pre-marriage amount was Galten's separate property, but it wrote $67,789.67 in the decree - $4,000 more than the record supported. The Court of Appeals agreed this was a clerical error and sent it back to be corrected, but otherwise upheld the finding that the original amount was Galten's separate property. The court rejected the parties' other arguments. It held that money Rupel spent maintaining his separate vehicles, and cash he withdrew after the divorce filing for meals, haircuts, massages, and similar expenses, was not marital waste, because there was enough evidence supporting the district court's findings. It held that the district court was correct not to enforce a supposed agreement to end the community on December 31, 2019, because the emails and testimony showed the spouses never actually agreed on the essential terms. It held that Galten did not prove Rupel earned an extra $100,246 in 2016, since Rupel and his accountant testified that figure resulted from a reporting error later corrected. And it rejected Galten's argument that the court lacked jurisdiction, concluding the decree was a final judgment.

This is a divorce case centered on how to divide property between a husband and wife when one spouse owns a business he started before the marriage. Shane Mamone founded a construction company, SCM, in 2000, years before he married Charisse in 2015. During the marriage, SCM grew and landed several large, multimillion-dollar contracts, largely through Shane's continued work, reputation, and business relationships. When the couple divorced, the central financial question was: how much of the increase in the business's value during the marriage belongs to the "community" (shared property both spouses can claim) versus Shane's "separate property" (what he brought into the marriage and keeps for himself)? Nevada courts use two competing methods to answer that question. One method, called Van Camp, tends to apply when a business grows mostly because of outside factors (like a booming economy). Under Van Camp, the community gets credited only with the fair value of the working spouse's labor, and the rest stays separate property. The other method, called Pereira, tends to apply when the growth comes mostly from the working spouse's own skill and effort. Under Pereira, the owner spouse keeps his original investment plus a fair rate of return, and any additional growth is shared as community property. The trial court used the Pereira method, finding that SCM's growth was due largely to Shane's own efforts. Shane even admitted at trial that the big contracts would not have come his way without the work he put in during the marriage. The Court of Appeals agreed there was enough evidence to support that choice, so it upheld the use of Pereira. Shane raised several other arguments. He said the community's share of the business should be reduced by all the household expenses paid during the marriage, some of which came from his separate money. The court rejected this because the couple's community money was never used up (Shane alone reported over $1.2 million in wages during the marriage that counted as community property). Under Nevada law, when a spouse voluntarily uses separate money to pay shared expenses while shared money is still available, that use is treated as a gift to the community, not something that must be paid back. The court did agree with Shane on one point. During the marriage, Shane took $37,500 out of SCM to repay his cousin for his half-interest in a separate rental property (200 Citrus LLC). The trial court handled this by increasing Charisse's share of the business by that amount. The Court of Appeals said the correct approach was instead to subtract the $37,500 from Shane's separate-property interest in the business before calculating the community share. Doing the math the correct way, the community interest in SCM should have been $547,500, not $510,000. Because this was a calculation error, the court reversed that part of the decree and sent it back to be corrected. On the retirement account (the SEP IRA), Shane argued the whole thing, or at least his early 2015 contributions, should be his separate property. But he began contributing the same year he married, and he gave no clear evidence about exactly when and how much he contributed. Because Nevada presumes property acquired after marriage is community property, and Shane didn't overcome that presumption, the court upheld splitting the account, with Charisse receiving half ($93,000). The court also upheld treating certain vehicles as community property (Shane didn't provide evidence they were separate) and dividing the couple's $206,625 tax overpayment equally as community property. Finally, Shane challenged having to pay 64 percent of Charisse's attorney fees. The court declined to consider this because Shane never filed a separate, timely appeal from the later order that actually awarded the fees, and he offered no supported legal argument that the award was an abuse of discretion. Charisse separately argued that the SEP IRA turned out to be worth far more than the roughly $186,000 Shane described at trial (a post-trial disclosure showed over $500,000). The court declined to address this because Charisse never filed a cross-appeal, which is required to change the judgment in her favor.

Adam and Chalese Solinger married in May 2012 and had two young children. Adam filed for divorce in January 2019, and the case took nearly three and a half years to resolve. Trial was held over five nonconsecutive days between May 2021 and March 2022, and eight witnesses testified, including a court-appointed custody evaluator, a rebuttal expert Chalese hired, a private investigator, family members, and both parents' romantic partners. After the trial ended but before the divorce decree was entered, Chalese's boyfriend became violent at the home they shared during her parenting time - he broke a television and threatened to keep her from leaving. Chalese took the children, left, and called the police; the boyfriend was arrested for domestic violence, and Chalese obtained a temporary protection order. Chalese asked to present testimony about this incident, which Adam did not oppose, and the district court considered it in deciding custody. The final decree gave the parents joint legal and joint physical custody on a week-on/week-off schedule, ordered Adam to pay child support, required Adam to pay all of the children's health insurance and 65 percent of their other medical, educational, and extracurricular costs, divided the couple's assets and debts, and awarded attorney fees to Chalese. On appeal, the Court of Appeals agreed with Adam on several money-related points but not on custody. The court affirmed the joint physical custody arrangement. Even though it agreed that two of the district court's findings (about alleged domestic violence by Adam and his supposed lack of financial support for Chalese) were mistaken, it concluded those mistakes did not change the outcome because the district court had done a thorough analysis of the child's best-interest factors and a majority still favored Chalese - yet the court still gave Adam joint physical custody. The court also explained that the statute Adam relied on for considering a partner's violent behavior applies to parents or others seeking custody, and Chalese's boyfriend was neither; but the district court was still allowed to consider the boyfriend's behavior as part of the broader best-interest analysis, and it did. The court found several errors in the financial parts of the decree. On child support, the district court said it used Adam's financial disclosure form and his own statements to find his income, but the number it used ($9,799 per month) did not match the figures in the record (Adam reported about $7,839.86 per month, and both sides agreed he earns roughly $94,000 a year). So the court sent the child support calculation back to be redone, with credit for any overpayments. On the 65 percent share of the children's medical, educational, and extracurricular costs, the court found the district court had not adequately explained its reasoning, especially since Adam already pays 100 percent of the children's health insurance and both parents had asked to split unreimbursed medical costs equally. Without a real explanation, the appeals court could not review the decision, so it reversed and sent it back. On the pension, the district court had awarded Chalese a "survivorship interest" in Adam's future state pension (PERS) and required him to choose a payout option that keeps paying a beneficiary after his death. The Court of Appeals explained that a survivorship interest is not itself community property, and giving Chalese this benefit was an unequal division of property because Adam would keep paying into the account for years after the marriage ended while Chalese contributed nothing. The district court had not made the findings needed to justify that unequal division - including why Chalese should be preferred over a possible future spouse or child - so the court reversed that award. Because the attorney-fee award (about $200,875) rested partly on the district court calling Chalese the "prevailing party," and because parts of the decree were being reversed, the court vacated the fee award so it could be reconsidered on remand. The court did reject one of Adam's fee arguments now, holding that Chalese's fee requests complied with the rules because her firms filed memorandums of fees and costs before final judgment. The court declined to reach Adam's other fee-related arguments at this time. On expert witness fees, the court reversed the $4,750 award for Chalese's rebuttal expert because the district court did not properly address all the required factors, particularly given that a neutral expert had already been appointed by the court. Finally, the court refused to order that a different judge handle the case on remand, explaining that a judge's rulings and actions during official proceedings are not, by themselves, grounds for disqualification.

Erich and Raina Martin married in 2002 while Erich served in the military. When they divorced in 2015, they negotiated a marital settlement agreement that the district court incorporated into the divorce decree. The decree gave Raina half of Erich's military retirement benefits. It also included a key promise: if Erich later chose to receive military disability pay instead of retirement pay (which would shrink Raina's share, because federal law requires veterans to waive retirement pay dollar-for-dollar to receive disability pay), Erich would reimburse Raina for the reduction. Erich retired in 2019, and Raina began receiving her share. In 2020, Erich elected full disability pay, waiving all retirement pay. The federal pay agency stopped sending Raina checks, and Erich refused to pay her himself, arguing federal law forbade it. Raina asked the district court to enforce the decree. The district court agreed with Raina and ordered Erich to pay her monthly installments equal to what she would have received absent the waiver. On appeal, Erich argued that federal law - specifically the Uniformed Services Former Spouses' Protection Act and two U.S. Supreme Court cases, Mansell v. Mansell and Howell v. Howell - bars state courts from ordering a veteran to make up the difference when disability pay reduces a former spouse's share of retirement pay. The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed. The majority drew a distinction: federal law does prevent state courts from dividing disability pay as community property or unilaterally ordering a veteran to indemnify a former spouse. But here, the parties themselves negotiated and agreed to the reimbursement provision, the district court entered that agreement as part of the divorce decree, and that decree became final. The court held that enforcing a final, agreed-upon decree under Nevada's res judicata (claim preclusion) doctrine and ordinary contract principles is different from a state court imposing such a division on its own. Under Nevada precedent, particularly Shelton v. Shelton, courts may enforce such agreements, and Erich may satisfy the obligation from any source of money he chooses, including his disability pay. The court also affirmed the $5000 attorney-fee award. Under NRS 125.040, a court in a divorce suit may require one party to pay money to enable the other to carry on or defend the suit, after considering each party's financial situation. The district court found Erich's income was about three times Raina's and tailored the award accordingly. The Nevada Supreme Court held that the four-factor Brunzell test for the reasonableness of attorney fees does not apply to such pendente lite awards because Brunzell evaluates work already performed, while NRS 125.040 fees cover prospective work - here, defending the appeal. Two justices concurred in the result. They would have held that the decree's indemnification provision is in fact preempted by federal law under Mansell and Howell, but agreed that under Nevada law, the decree had become a final judgment that Erich could not collaterally attack, so res judicata required affirmance.

Erich and Raina Martin divorced in 2015 after Erich had served in the military. As part of their divorce, they signed a settlement agreement, which the district court incorporated into the divorce decree. The decree gave Raina half of Erich's military retirement benefits. Critically, it also said that if Erich later chose to take military disability pay instead of retirement pay, he would have to reimburse Raina for any reduction in her share. That contingency mattered because of how federal law treats military pay. A veteran who wants tax-free disability benefits must give up an equal amount of taxable retirement pay - he cannot collect both for the same dollars. When Erich retired in 2019, Raina began receiving her share of his retirement pay directly from the Defense Finance and Accounting Service (DFAS). The next year, Erich elected full disability pay, which wiped out all of his retirement pay - and with it, Raina's share. When Raina asked him to make up the difference as the decree required, he refused, arguing that federal law forbade it. Raina asked the district court to enforce the decree. The court agreed and ordered Erich to pay her the monthly amounts she would have received absent his waiver. The court also awarded Raina $5000 toward her attorney fees for the appeal, citing the large income disparity between the parties. On appeal, the Nevada Supreme Court affirmed. The court explained that under U.S. Supreme Court decisions in Mansell v. Mansell and Howell v. Howell, a state court cannot, on its own authority, treat military disability pay as community property or order a veteran to "indemnify" a former spouse for the dollar amount of retirement pay the veteran chose to waive in favor of disability pay. But the Nevada court drew a distinction: those federal cases addressed what a state court can order on its own; they did not bar enforcement of an indemnification term that the divorcing spouses themselves negotiated and put into their property settlement. Because Erich and Raina expressly agreed to the reimbursement provision, and because the divorce decree had become a final judgment, the doctrine of res judicata (which prevents parties from relitigating matters already resolved in a final judgment) required enforcement. The court also held that the district court did not abuse its discretion by awarding $5000 in pendente lite (during-litigation) attorney fees under NRS 125.040 without analyzing the Brunzell factors. Those factors evaluate the quality of work already performed, whereas NRS 125.040 fees are designed to fund work yet to be done. A two-justice concurrence by Justice Cadish, joined by Justice Pickering, agreed the decree should be enforced - but only because res judicata bars Erich's collateral attack on the final judgment. The concurrence would have held that the reimbursement provision itself is preempted by federal law, even though the parties had agreed to it, and would overrule Shelton v. Shelton to that extent.

This case arose from a contentious divorce between Raymond Snyder and Lauara Snyder. Raymond filed for divorce first, claiming he had lived in Nevada for six weeks before filing. Lauara answered and filed her own counterclaim for divorce, denying that Raymond met the residency requirement but stating that she herself had lived in Nevada for more than six weeks before filing her answer and counterclaim. After a trial, the district court granted the divorce, divided the couple's property, and awarded Lauara attorney fees. Raymond then appealed the divorce decree and several later orders. The Court of Appeals split its analysis across three appeals. In the first appeal (the divorce decree), Raymond argued the trial court had no authority to grant the divorce at all, because neither spouse met Nevada's requirement that someone live in the state for at least six weeks before starting a divorce case. The evidence showed Raymond did not meet that six-week requirement when he filed, and Lauara had lived in Nevada only about three weeks when Raymond filed. But Lauara did meet the six-week requirement by the time she filed her counterclaim. The trial court treated Lauara's counterclaim as essentially its own independent divorce action, and the appeals court agreed this was proper. The court reasoned that if Lauara had simply filed her own separate divorce complaint, there would be no question the court had authority to hear it, so the same result should follow when she raised the claim as a counterclaim. The court also rejected Raymond's argument that the court lacked personal jurisdiction over him because Lauara did not personally serve him with her counterclaim, holding that Raymond gave up (waived) that objection by not raising it at the proper time. On the property disputes, the court reviewed the trial court's decisions for "abuse of discretion" - meaning the appeals court would not disturb findings supported by reasonable evidence. The court upheld several rulings but sent others back for more work. It affirmed the trial court's conclusion that four businesses were Lauara's separate property, largely because the trial court found Raymond was not a credible witness and because Lauara presented consistent evidence that she owned the businesses before the marriage and never transferred an interest to Raymond. However, the court found the trial court had left several narrower questions unresolved - such as how to handle loans the couple made to the businesses from shared funds, and whether the marital community should be reimbursed for community money used on a business's legal expenses. Those issues were sent back. The court also reversed and remanded several other property rulings. On improvements to the marital residence, the trial court had ordered Raymond to reimburse Lauara $130,000, but the appeals court found there was no evidence showing that the money spent actually increased the home's value, which is required. On funds Raymond received as workers' compensation disability benefits, the court adopted a new framework (explained below) for classifying such benefits in a divorce and sent the issue back. Because that classification could change how money in Raymond's personal bank account is traced, related rulings - including the split of the couple's 401K and IRA retirement accounts and a $75,000 reimbursement Raymond was ordered to pay - also had to be reconsidered. Finally, on attorney fees, the court found the trial court did not identify a clear legal basis for the award and did not make the findings Nevada law requires before awarding fees, including weighing certain factors and separating out fees related to different parts of the litigation. That award was reversed and remanded too. In the second and third appeals (the March 31 order and the May 5 judgment and QDRO), the court did not reach the merits at all. It held that it lacked jurisdiction to hear those appeals because no statute or court rule allows an appeal from those particular kinds of orders. Those two appeals were dismissed.

Grady and Caterina Byrd divorced in 2014 after a long marriage during which Grady served in the military. Their marital settlement agreement, which was folded into the divorce decree, said neither spouse would pay the other alimony, but Grady would pay Caterina $1,500 per month to help with her mortgage, and Caterina would receive 50 percent of Grady's military retirement pay. For about four years, Grady paid Caterina $3,000 per month total. In 2018 he stopped paying without explanation, and Caterina went back to court to enforce the decree. During that litigation, it came out that before the divorce Grady had waived nearly $3,000 of his monthly military retirement pay in order to receive veteran's disability benefits instead. Because of that waiver, Caterina's 50 percent share of the pension was actually only about $64.20 per month, not the roughly $1,500 she believed she was getting. Caterina argued Grady had misrepresented his retirement income at the time of the divorce and asked the court to reopen the decree. The district court agreed, used NRCP 60(b)(6) - a catch-all rule that allows a court to set aside a judgment for "any other reason that justifies relief" - to set aside parts of the decree, and ordered Grady to pay Caterina lifetime alimony out of his disability benefits. The court also refused to let Grady, who lives in the Philippines and submitted notes from three healthcare providers saying he could not fly internationally, appear at the evidentiary hearing by video. He did not attend, and his side of the story was never heard at the hearing. The Court of Appeals reversed on three points. First, NRCP 60(b)(6) was the wrong tool. That subsection is reserved for "extraordinary circumstances" not already covered by the rule's other, more specific subsections. Caterina's complaint - that Grady misled her about the value of his pension - is exactly the kind of fraud-or-mistake claim that fits under NRCP 60(b)(1) or 60(b)(3). Those subsections come with a six-month deadline, which had long since passed. A party cannot use the catch-all subsection to escape that deadline. Second, federal law forbids what the district court did with the disability money. Under U.S. Supreme Court decisions Mansell v. Mansell and Howell v. Howell, when a veteran waives part of his retirement pay to receive disability benefits, state courts cannot order him to reimburse or indemnify his former spouse out of those disability benefits - no matter what label (alimony, community property, reimbursement) the state court uses. The district court's order requiring Grady to pay Caterina "from [his] military pension disability" is precisely what federal law prohibits. Third, on the video-appearance issue, Nevada Supreme Court Rules Part IX-B(B) generally favor letting parties appear by audiovisual transmission and require courts to evaluate "good cause" using a list of factors. The district court here did not analyze those factors on the record. However, because the evidentiary hearing was combined with a show-cause hearing on Grady's failure to pay - and the rules require personal appearance at a show-cause hearing - the appellate court could not say the district court abused its discretion in requiring Grady to appear in person on this particular occasion. The Court of Appeals noted that on remand, if Grady asks again, the district court must actually consider the good-cause factors, and it suggested trial courts can split a show-cause hearing from a separate evidentiary hearing so a party can still appear remotely for the latter. The case now goes back to the district court, which is told to reconsider Caterina's enforcement motion under proper authority - including possibly NRS 125.150, which permits modification of alimony in some circumstances - and to handle any future remote-appearance requests by working through the required factors.

Richard and Eleni Kilgore married in 1992, both worked for Clark County (Richard as a marshal, Eleni as a teacher), and both earned retirement benefits through Nevada's PERS system. They divorced in 2013. The decree said how each spouse's PERS benefits would be split when the time came, but it did not address vacation pay or sick pay either spouse had built up during the marriage. In 2015, Eleni asked the district court to make Richard start paying her share of his PERS benefits, because Richard had reached the age and years-of-service combination that made him eligible to retire (he became eligible in 2011, when he turned 50, after more than 20 years as a marshal). She also asked for half of the vacation and sick pay Richard had accumulated during the marriage. Richard wanted to keep working to maximize his pension and argued he should not have to pay Eleni anything until he actually retires. The district court agreed that Eleni was entitled to her community-property share dating back to her March 2015 motion. It calculated that, had Richard retired, Eleni would have received $2,455 per month from PERS. Adding up the period from March 2015 to early 2017, the court found Richard owed Eleni $56,575.76 and reduced that to a judgment Eleni could collect by lawful means. But after looking closely at Richard's finances - his child-support obligation, basic living expenses, and what garnishment law would allow - the court ordered Richard to pay only $350 per month toward that judgment, rather than the full $2,455. The court also ordered Richard to pay Eleni half of the vacation and sick pay he had accrued during the marriage (after taxes). Both sides appealed. Richard argued the court should not have ordered any pre-retirement payment. Eleni argued she should have received the full $2,455 per month. Richard also argued vacation and sick pay are not community property and that it was too late to raise them. The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed everything. On the pension question, the court explained that under its prior decision in Gemma v. Gemma, a non-employee spouse can ask for her share of pension benefits once the employee spouse is first eligible to retire, even if he keeps working. But the Legislature later passed NRS 125.155, which gives the district court discretion to deny - or, the Supreme Court reasoned, reduce - such pre-retirement payments. The district court here used that discretion fairly: it preserved Eleni's full community-property interest by entering a judgment for the full amount owed, while letting Richard pay it down at $350 per month given his finances. On the vacation and sick pay, the court explained that a 2015 statute, NRS 125.150(3), lets either spouse come back within three years of discovering a mistakenly omitted asset and ask the court to divide it. Eleni did so within that window. The court held that vacation and sick pay earned during the marriage are a form of deferred compensation and therefore community property, even though they may be cashed out later.

Howard and Kristin Henson divorced in 1995. Their decree divided Howard's state pension (PERS) equally, using the 'time rule' and 'wait and see' approach from Gemma and Fondi. Years later, in 1999, a qualified domestic relations order (QDRO) was entered - at Kristin's request and without notice to Howard - that not only gave Kristin her share of the pension but also named her as Howard's survivor beneficiary, which prevented Howard from naming his new wife. In 2011 Howard asked the court to fix the QDRO. Kristin, in turn, asked to be paid the pension amounts she claimed she should have been receiving since Howard became eligible to retire in 2003. The Nevada Supreme Court, sitting en banc, ruled for Howard on both points. First, unless a divorce decree specifically says so, dividing a community-property interest in a pension does not also give the nonemployee spouse survivor benefits. The decree here divided only 'the pension' and did not award survivor benefits, so the QDRO wrongly made Kristin the survivor beneficiary; the amended QDRO (paying Kristin as if the unmodified benefit, so Howard could name another survivor without reducing her share) correctly carried out the decree. Second, when the employee spouse is eligible to retire but has not retired, the nonemployee spouse must file a motion in court asking to start receiving payments before any obligation to pay arises. Because Kristin never filed such a motion, Howard owed nothing for the years since 2003.

Craig and Catherine Doan married in 1985 and later divorced. Craig worked as an air traffic controller for the FAA for more than 23 years and earned federal retirement benefits. During the divorce, both spouses filed sworn financial statements indicating they had retirement accounts or pensions, and Catherine's pretrial memorandum specifically identified Craig's federal retirement benefits as property earned during the marriage. After their lawyers withdrew shortly before trial, the couple settled their property division themselves at a conference with the judge. The final divorce decree, entered in August 2003, divided one retirement asset (a voluntary thrift savings plan) but said nothing about Craig's FAA retirement benefit. Six years later, in June 2009, Catherine asked the court to divide the FAA retirement benefit, arguing it had been left out of the decree and should now be split. The district court first denied her motion, finding the benefit had been fully disclosed during the divorce. But after Catherine asked the court to reconsider, the court changed course: it found the benefit had been left out of the decree by "mutual mistake" and divided it using a federal formula. The Nevada Supreme Court reversed. It explained that under NRCP 60(b) - a rule of court procedure allowing a party to ask for relief from a final judgment - a motion based on mistake, newly discovered evidence, or fraud must be filed within six months of the judgment. Catherine waited more than six years, so her motion was too late. The court then asked whether her request could instead be treated as an "independent action" - a separate lawsuit seeking relief in equity, which is not subject to the six-month deadline but requires a much higher showing: it is available "only to prevent a grave miscarriage of justice." The court held that Catherine could not meet that standard. Nevada law recognizes that when a marital asset was never litigated or decided in the divorce - for example, because neither party mentioned it - it can be divided later through an equitable action. But here, the FAA retirement benefit was disclosed and discussed throughout the divorce proceedings: it appeared in Craig's pay statements, W-2 forms, and financial affidavit, and Catherine's own pretrial memorandum named it as property to be divided. The district court even found that the benefit was considered in setting the length of alimony. The Supreme Court explained that the key question is whether the asset was actually litigated and decided in the divorce, not simply whether it was written into the decree. Because the benefit was before the court in the original divorce, it was not an "omitted asset," and leaving it out of the written decree was not the kind of exceptional circumstance that justifies reopening a final judgment years later. Whether Nevada should have a law allowing courts to divide property merely left out of a decree - as California does - is, the court said, a question for the Legislature.

Rod Mason, a U.S. Air Force servicemember, married Martine Cuisenaire while stationed in Belgium. After about eleven years, Mason obtained a divorce in North Carolina, where the couple was living. The North Carolina judgment granted Mason the divorce, gave Cuisenaire primary physical custody of their child, gave Mason summer visitation, and stated that "there are no pending claims for post-separation support, alimony, or equitable distribution." It said nothing about child support. Cuisenaire and the child moved to Belgium; Mason was later stationed at Nellis Air Force Base in Las Vegas. After Mason failed to return the child to Belgium at the end of summer 2000, Cuisenaire won a federal court order under the Hague Convention and its implementing legislation requiring the child's return. In February 2002, she asked the Nevada state district court for post-decree child support, alimony, division of assets, and attorney fees, including back child support running from the date of the North Carolina divorce. The Nevada district court awarded her current child support, more than $10,000 in child support arrears under a Nevada statute (NRS 125B.030), and a portion of Mason's military retirement benefits, while denying alimony and setting a further hearing on other assets. On appeal, the Nevada Supreme Court addressed three main questions. First, it held that the North Carolina divorce judgment was entitled to "full faith and credit" - the constitutional requirement that courts of one state respect final judgments of another state unless the judgment was obtained by fraud, without due process, or without jurisdiction. Cuisenaire raised various attacks on the North Carolina judgment on appeal, but because she had not raised those attacks in the district court, the Supreme Court declined to consider them. Second, the court held that the Nevada district court should not have used NRS 125B.030 to award back support. That statute lets a custodial parent recover up to four years of past support when the parents are "separated," but the court concluded the term does not cover parents who are already divorced and are seeking support for the period after the divorce became final. Third, the court held that back child support was nonetheless available - just under North Carolina law rather than the Nevada statute. Because no North Carolina case answered whether a divorce judgment silent on child support counts as a child support order, the court looked to a Nebraska Supreme Court decision, Willers ex rel. Powell v. Willers, and agreed that a divorce decree that says nothing about child support does not prevent a court from later ordering support retroactively to the date of the decree. The court sent the case back to the district court to recalculate the arrears using North Carolina child support guidelines. It declined to review the military retirement issue, which the parties agreed was moot after Mason's death, and directed the district court to hold an evidentiary hearing on survivor benefits, an issue the district court had not yet decided.

Roland and Maryann Shelton divorced after Roland's Navy career. Their divorce agreement, incorporated into the decree, split Roland's military retirement pay and gave Maryann $577 per month 'until her demise.' At the time, Roland was rated ten percent disabled and received a small disability payment. Roland made the required payments for two years. Then the Department of Veterans Affairs increased Roland's disability rating to 100 percent. Federal law lets a veteran waive military retirement pay in exchange for tax-free disability pay, and Roland did exactly that - waiving all his retirement pay for disability pay. He then stopped paying Maryann, arguing that federal law prohibits treating a veteran's disability pay as community property, so Maryann was entitled to nothing. The district court reluctantly agreed with Roland, relying on a U.S. Supreme Court decision (Mansell) that says states cannot divide military disability pay as community property. But it also felt the result was deeply unfair to Maryann. The Nevada Supreme Court reversed. It agreed that states cannot treat disability pay itself as community property, but it held that state contract law is a different matter and is not preempted by federal law. Roland had a contractual obligation - agreed to in the divorce decree - to pay Maryann $577 per month. He could not escape that obligation simply by unilaterally choosing to convert his retirement pay into disability pay. The court found the agreement, though ambiguous, was best read as requiring Roland to pay a fixed $577 monthly, which he had ratified by paying it for two years. Roland had to satisfy his contractual obligation from his other assets, and even his disability pay could be used voluntarily to do so. The court sent the case back for further proceedings.

Roberta and Gerhard Wolff married in 1982. Gerhard had worked for the Nevada Highway Patrol since 1972 and was in the state retirement system (PERS). They settled everything in their 1994 divorce except how to handle Gerhard's pension. The community had a 54% interest in it, worth about $1,155 a month. Because Gerhard kept working past his retirement eligibility date, the trial court did several things the Nevada Supreme Court found improper. First, it labeled Roberta's share of the pension as 'limited temporary spousal support' of $450 a month. The Court held this was wrong: a pension share is community property, which cannot be modified later, while spousal support can be reduced or ended on remarriage, death, or changed circumstances. Second, the trial court cut Roberta's monthly amount from about $578 to $450 without adequate explanation, violating the rule that community property is divided equally. Third, it wrongly ordered Gerhard to buy life insurance for Roberta's benefit, an unequal burden, especially since PERS already provides survivor protections. The Court upheld two rulings. Roberta's estate is entitled to her pension share if she dies before Gerhard, because at divorce the community interest becomes each spouse's separate property. And the trial court correctly treated each spouse's Social Security as their own separate property - but it erred by 'considering' Roberta's Social Security to reduce her PERS share, which is an improper offset.

Mona and Mark Sertic divorced after about eleven years of marriage. One dispute was over Mona's federal pension. Instead of waiting until Mona could retire, the trial court cashed out Mark's community share of her pension at the time of trial. The Nevada Supreme Court held that dividing a pension at trial is permitted only if three conditions are met: (1) the court can determine the present value of the community share with reasonable certainty; (2) there are enough existing funds (or other separate property) to pay the other spouse's share; and (3) both spouses agree the distribution will be final, no matter what happens later. Because the trial court miscalculated present value and it was unclear whether both parties agreed to a final distribution, the Court reversed. On remand, if those conditions are not met, the court may instead give Mark his share as Mona receives it when she first becomes eligible to retire; and if Mona chooses not to retire when eligible, she must pay Mark what he would have received. The Court also held the trial court used the wrong salary figure. Under the 'wait and see' approach from Gemma and Fondi, the pension must be valued using the highest three consecutive years of salary over Mona's whole career, not just during the marriage. Finally, the Court affirmed the trial court's decision to alternate the child's tax dependency exemption between the parents, requiring the custodial parent to sign the necessary IRS waiver.

John and Aurora Carrell divorced in 1990. Both had pensions. The trial court let each spouse keep their own pension, but because Aurora's pension was worth less than John's, it ordered John to pay her 'spousal support' in an amount that would even out the two pensions to a 50/50 split. The Nevada Supreme Court held this was error. Retirement benefits earned during a marriage are community property. Calling Aurora's share 'spousal support' was a problem because spousal support can later be modified or ended if circumstances change, if the recipient remarries, or on death - while a share of community property is fixed and cannot be modified later. By mislabeling her community-property pension share as support, the trial court wrongly exposed it to possible future reduction. The Court also reversed a $6,001 award of post-trial attorney's fees to John. A court can award reasonable attorney's fees in a divorce, but here the court made no findings to support the amount, and the record did not support it - John himself had stated he spent only $2,101 in post-trial fees. The Court sent the case back to recharacterize Aurora's pension as community property and to make proper findings on any attorney's fees.

After twenty-five years of marriage, Trudy and Austin Carlson divorced. Austin had a pension from roughly twenty years working at Kaiser Steel; when he retired he chose an irrevocable "Life and Surviving Spouse" option that would pay Trudy monthly benefits if she outlived him. During settlement negotiations, Trudy's lawyer tried to get the pension's true value from the plan administrator (New York Life), but the administrator responded slowly and did not reveal the actual value until after the divorce decree was entered. Relying on Austin's and his counsel's representation that the proposed division was "essentially equal," Trudy agreed to the settlement, which the court incorporated into the decree. Trudy later learned the pension's true value and realized she had received only about twenty-nine percent of the couple's assets. She asked the court to reopen the decree under the rule allowing relief from judgments (NRCP 60(b)). A domestic relations referee recommended granting relief, but the district judge overruled the referee. The Nevada Supreme Court reversed. The court explained that a district court reviewing a referee's report is not required to accept it merely because it is supported by evidence, but reviews such motions for abuse of discretion, and Rule 60(b) is to be construed liberally to redress injustice. On this record, the "essentially equal" representation was either a mutual mistake (grounds for relief under Rule 60(b)(1)) or, if Austin or his lawyer knew the pension's real value, a fraud (grounds under Rule 60(b)(2)). Either way, Trudy was entitled to relief. The court also held the decree should be amended so it qualifies as a "qualified domestic relations order" (QDRO) formally naming Trudy as Austin's surviving spouse, so she would not lose the survivor benefits under federal pension law; because Austin's election was irrevocable, the designation would not affect his own annuity. Reversed and remanded.

Janice and Michael Fondi married in 1973. Michael became a district court judge and was in the state retirement system (PERS). When they divorced, the two disputed issues were how to divide Michael's pension and whether Janice should get alimony. On the pension, the trial court had calculated Janice's share as if Michael retired on the day of the divorce - roughly 60% community share, half of which went to Janice as about $1,015 a month. The Nevada Supreme Court reversed this method. It explained that under its recent Gemma decision, the community's share must be measured against the pension Michael will actually receive at retirement (the 'wait and see' approach) - a term this opinion coined - not the smaller pension he would get if he stopped working at divorce. The trial court had also wrongly assumed Michael's re-elections would require 'extraordinary effort' and shifted the burden onto Janice; under Gemma, only the employee spouse can later prove such extraordinary post-divorce effort. On alimony, the Court affirmed the denial. Comparing the case to Heim v. Heim (a 35-year marriage that left the wife destitute), the Court found Janice's situation very different: she left with marketable skills as a legal secretary, a $91,000 cash award, and a pension interest, and had not given up a career to raise children. Calling it a 'very close case,' the Court still held that denying alimony was not an abuse of discretion, and that the court properly declined to keep jurisdiction over future alimony.

Robert and Cecelia Powers married in New York in 1962. Robert began working for the New York City Department of Corrections in 1968. In 1974, a knee operation severed a nerve, leaving him with a condition called drop foot, and a medical board found him disabled, forcing his retirement in 1979. Robert was not eligible for regular retirement benefits, but he was eligible for disability retirement benefits, and he and Cecelia chose an option that paid a benefit for Robert's life. The couple then moved to Las Vegas, and Cecelia filed for divorce in 1987. They disagreed about whether the disability retirement benefits were community property (to be divided) or Robert's separate property, and about spousal support. The district court found the benefits were community property because they appeared substantially related to Robert's employment. It noted that part of the payment could be seen as replacing lost earnings, but it could not determine how much. The court added that if it had not treated the benefits as community property, it would have awarded Cecelia alimony instead. On appeal, Robert argued for the first time that New York law should govern whether the benefits could be divided. The Nevada Supreme Court refused to consider that new theory, because a party cannot raise on appeal a theory different from the one argued below; in the trial court, Robert had argued the benefits were his separate property under New York law and that New York law agreed with community property principles. The court explained that community property states - and New York - recognize that disability retirement benefits can have two parts: one replacing lost earnings and one that is a retirement benefit. The district court had found Robert's benefits included a retirement component, and Robert offered no authority to the contrary. Because he could not argue for the first time on appeal that the benefits contained no divisible retirement component, the court affirmed.

Joseph Gemma joined the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department in January 1980 and became a member of the Public Employees' Retirement System (PERS). He married Lois in May 1981. When they divorced in 1988, the main fight was over Joseph's police pension - which had not yet 'vested' (he had not worked long enough to have a guaranteed right to it). Joseph argued his not-yet-vested pension should not count as community property, and that even if it did, his ex-wife should not be able to start collecting her share until he actually chose to retire. The Nevada Supreme Court rejected both arguments. The Court held that a pension earned during a marriage is community property even if it has not vested. To divide it fairly, courts should use the 'time rule': the community's share is a fraction - the months the couple was married while the pension was being earned, divided by the total months worked to earn full benefits. The nonemployee spouse's share is generally measured against the pension the employee actually receives at retirement (usually based on the highest salary near the end of a career), because the early working years are the building blocks of that higher salary. The Court also held the nonemployee spouse (Lois) can choose to start receiving her share once Joseph is first eligible to retire - he cannot control the timing by refusing to retire. To protect against unfairness, if the employee spouse believes a big later raise came from extraordinary post-divorce effort (like a new degree or a major promotion), he can ask the court to keep jurisdiction and later recalculate.

This consolidated appeal turned on a rapidly changing statute. In 1987, the Nevada legislature passed a law (NRS 125.161) that let an ex-spouse of a military retiree go back to court and divide the retiree's military retirement benefits by the time served during the marriage - but only if those benefits had not already been divided in the divorce property agreement. That law effectively reversed an earlier Nevada Supreme Court decision (Tomlinson v. Tomlinson) which had held that trying to divide retirement benefits after the divorce was over was barred by the rule against relitigating settled matters (res judicata). The wives in these cases used the new statute to sue to divide their former husbands' military retirement benefits, and the district court ruled in their favor, dividing the benefits. But then, on March 20, 1989, the governor signed Senate Bill 11, which repealed NRS 125.161 effective immediately. Senate Bill 11 also said that the courts - including the Nevada Supreme Court - would immediately lose jurisdiction over any case brought under NRS 125.161 that was on appeal but not yet affirmed. The Nevada Supreme Court held that Senate Bill 11 wiped out the statutory basis for these partition actions in any case still pending when the governor signed it. The wives argued that, even without the statute, the court could still uphold the divisions using ordinary community-property principles. The court disagreed. It explained that before NRS 125.161 existed, Nevada law - based on res judicata (Tomlinson) - did not allow a new lawsuit to divide retirement benefits after a divorce property agreement had become a final judgment, absent fraud. The court refused to recognize any such common-law claim. So, with the statute repealed and no common-law substitute, the court reversed the divisions and directed the trial court to enter judgment for the husbands.

James and Lee Walsh were divorced in 1980. Lee's attorney drafted the divorce decree, and James had no lawyer. The decree gave Lee "one-half of [James's] pension with the United States Government." Five years later, when James retired and began drawing his federal pension, Lee claimed she was entitled to half of the entire pension - including the part James earned during the five years he kept working after the divorce. James asked the court to clarify what the decree meant. The referee and trial court concluded that the decree unambiguously gave Lee half of the whole pension and that they had no power to change the decree because more than six months had passed since it was entered. The Nevada Supreme Court reversed. It explained that only retirement benefits earned during the marriage are community property, so James was entitled to keep, as his own separate property, benefits he earned after the divorce. The court held that the phrase "one-half of [James's] pension" did not clearly entitle Lee to a share of post-divorce earnings, and that reading the decree as a whole showed the opposite intent - the decree divided other assets equally and referred to Lee's "community interest" in the pension. Because the decree could be interpreted from its own language, no further hearing was needed; Lee was entitled only to one-half of the portion of the pension earned before the divorce.

Robert Tomlinson served in the military starting in 1941 and married Rosemary in 1946. A Michigan court granted Rosemary a divorce in 1971. That divorce judgment addressed alimony, child support, and property division, but it said nothing about Robert's military pension. In 1985 - fourteen years after the divorce - Rosemary filed a new complaint in Nevada seeking 41 percent of Robert's military retirement pay. The district court dismissed her complaint, and the Nevada Supreme Court affirmed. Rosemary relied on a federal law (the Uniformed Services Former Spouses Protection Act) that Congress passed to let state courts divide military pensions after a 1981 U.S. Supreme Court decision (McCarty v. McCarty) had said they could not. But the Nevada court explained that Congress intended only to restore the law to where it stood before McCarty, not to create new rights to reopen final divorce decrees issued before McCarty. So the federal statute gave Rosemary no power to reopen her 1971 decree. The court also held that Rosemary's claim was barred by res judicata. Her rights would be governed by Michigan law (the marital home at the time of the divorce), and although Michigan now allows military pensions to be divided as marital assets, that does not mean they must be. More importantly, both parties had lawyers in 1971 and Rosemary could have raised the pension then or on appeal. Because she did not, she was barred from raising it in 1986.

Phyllis Burton and Jimmie Burton were divorced in June 1982. Their divorce decree treated Jimmie's military retirement benefits as his own separate property, which was the correct result at the time under a 1981 U.S. Supreme Court decision (McCarty v. McCarty) that barred state courts from dividing federal military retirement pay as community property. After the divorce, Congress changed the law. It passed the Uniformed Services Former Spouses' Protection Act, which again allowed state courts to divide military retirement benefits under state law. The Nevada Legislature then passed its own law, effective May 15, 1983, letting former military spouses who had divorced during a specific window (June 26, 1981 to January 31, 1983) go back to the district court and ask to have the property division re-examined to determine their rights to support or to a share of the military pension. Phyllis had filed a motion to modify her divorce decree, which the district court denied (most likely because it believed it had no power to change the decree). She appealed. While the appeal was pending, the new Nevada statute took effect, and she asked the Supreme Court to send the case back to the district court so it could reconsider under the new law. Before granting that request, the Supreme Court had to decide whether it even had the power to hear an appeal from an order refusing to modify a divorce decree. The court held that it did. It explained that when a party seeks to modify a decree based on a change in facts or law that happened after the divorce - and is not just re-attacking the original judgment - the denial is an appealable "special order made after final judgment." Because Phyllis was pointing to the new federal and state laws, her appeal was proper. The court then granted her unopposed motion and sent the case back so the district court could reconsider the property division under the new statutes.

When Forrest and Dicksie Duke divorced, the district court's July 1980 decree awarded Dicksie 35 percent of Forrest's military retirement pay as community property, and ordered Forrest to set up a permanent allotment with the U.S. Air Force so Dicksie's share would be sent directly to her. Forrest never set up the allotment, and never appealed the divorce decree. In June 1981, Dicksie asked the court for a judgment for the arrearages (the unpaid share of the retirement benefits Forrest owed her). Forrest fought that request and filed his own motion to modify the decree. He argued that a recent U.S. Supreme Court decision, McCarty v. McCarty, meant the district court no longer had the power to enforce the part of the decree giving Dicksie a share of his military retirement pay. (McCarty had held that state courts may not divide military retirement benefits as community property.) The district court denied Forrest's motion, and he appealed. The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed. It held that McCarty does not apply retroactively to disturb a divorce decree that was already final and unappealed before McCarty was decided. Nothing in McCarty suggested the U.S. Supreme Court meant it to invalidate earlier, valid, unappealed state decrees, and most courts had held that McCarty does not change the res judicata (finality) effect of a decree that became final before McCarty. Because the Dukes' decree was final and never appealed, the district court correctly refused to modify it, and Dicksie remained entitled to enforce her 35 percent share.

About three years after the McCarrolls' divorce became final, the former wife filed a new lawsuit. Their divorce had approved an oral agreement dividing the community property, but that agreement said nothing about the former husband's U.S. Forest Service retirement pension, and the pension was never mentioned during the divorce. The former wife now claimed the husband had fraudulently hidden the pension, and she asked the court to declare it a community asset and give her a share. The trial court granted summary judgment for the former husband, and the Nevada Supreme Court affirmed. The key point was the difference between two kinds of fraud. 'Extrinsic' fraud - the kind that prevents a person from fairly presenting their case - can justify reopening an old judgment. 'Intrinsic' fraud cannot. Here, the court found that any fraud was only intrinsic, because the former wife had a fair opportunity during the divorce to raise the very claim about the pension that she was now trying to make. Because of that, the court rule that limits reopening old judgments barred her lawsuit, and the summary judgment for the husband was upheld.

In this divorce, the district court first entered a partial decree in January 1976 that ended the marriage but expressly reserved the questions of property division and alimony for later. A supplemental decree resolving those issues followed in May 1976. The husband appealed several parts of the final result. The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed most of the rulings but reversed one. On the husband's retirement plan, the court upheld awarding the wife a half-interest in the benefits that accrued up to the May supplemental decree, explaining that the January decree was only interlocutory (not final) because it reserved the property questions, so the community continued to have an interest in the retirement benefits until the final decree. On alimony, the court affirmed the $750 per month award, noting substantial evidence that the wife could not work because of a chronic bowel disease and would lose the husband's medical coverage. It also affirmed the $3,000 attorney fee award, reiterating that a spouse need not be in necessitous circumstances to receive fees. And it upheld the order requiring the husband to pay "all outstanding debts," finding the record made the obligation sufficiently certain. The one reversal concerned two old community-property cars the court had awarded to the parties' two adult daughters. The Supreme Court held this was error: the statutory power to dispose of community property for the benefit of children does not extend to children who have reached the age of majority. That part was reversed and remanded for redistribution of the two vehicles.

A judgment gave the husband a divorce, custody of the couple's minor son, and a division of their community property. The wife filed a motion to amend the judgment, asking instead to be granted the divorce, to receive the entire family home as her separate property, along with a car and $150 per month alimony, to be awarded attorney fees, and to have the husband pay all community debts. The trial court denied the motion, and she appealed. The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed. It explained that a trial court's decisions on conflicting evidence, on dividing property, and on alimony are reviewed with deference and will not be reversed unless they are clearly erroneous, unsupported by substantial evidence, or an abuse of discretion. Substantial evidence supported granting the husband the divorce and custody and making a 'just and equitable' (not necessarily exactly equal) division of the community property. Attorney fees, although no longer requiring a showing of financial need, are discretionary, and the denial was proper because the wife offered no evidence to support her request. Finally, she could not complain that the husband received his public-employee retirement fund, because her own motion had asked that he be awarded it - so she was not an 'aggrieved party' on that point.

The husband sued for divorce on the ground of extreme cruelty; the wife counterclaimed for separate maintenance, also alleging cruelty. The trial court granted the husband a divorce. The wife appealed, arguing that the husband had not shown that her mental cruelty caused danger to his life, limb, or health, or a reasonable apprehension of such danger, which Nevada law requires for extreme cruelty. The evidence showed the wife engaged in a series of relationships with other men that would be intolerable to any husband. The husband, however, was an understated witness who initially downplayed the effect on him, though he eventually testified he was edgy, irritable, hard to get along with, and could not live under those conditions in good health. The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed. It reaffirmed that extreme cruelty must result in danger to life, limb, or health (or reasonable apprehension of it), but stressed that the trial judge is in the best position to evaluate the witnesses. Just as a judge can discount overstatements and exaggerations, the judge can account for understatement, shyness, and timidity. Given the husband's testimony and the trial court's finding that his health was impaired by the wife's conduct, the finding of extreme cruelty was justified. The court also upheld the finding that there was no community property: a 5 percent interest in a family farm had been given to the husband individually, and even if received during marriage, a gift is separate property.

The couple married in 1954, and the wife was granted a divorce in 1959 on the ground of extreme cruelty. She appealed only the part of the decree that gave the husband about 30 shares of Firestone stock. The trial court had found the stock was the husband's separate property - purchased during the marriage but with either money he had before the marriage or money he borrowed from his parents on his own credit. Because there was no child and no support ordered, if the stock was separate property, the court had no power to give any of it to the wife. The husband testified he borrowed $3,900 in 1956 and $1,000 in 1957 from his parents to buy the stock, gave them promissory notes, still owed the money, and had pledged some shares to them. But he produced no notes, his parents did not testify, and he could not say what the stock was worth. The legal starting point favored the wife: property bought during a marriage is presumed to be community property, money borrowed during a marriage is presumed community, stock bought with it is presumed community, and putting the stock only in the husband's name does not change that. To win, the husband had to overcome these presumptions with clear and convincing evidence. There was some conflicting evidence - notably a $3,525 cashier's check bought with the husband's separate funds and endorsed over to Firestone - suggesting he actually used separate money, not borrowed money, to buy the stock. Either way, the husband had separate funds available and there was evidence they were used. The Nevada Supreme Court held that whether the evidence was clear and convincing enough to rebut the community-property presumption was a question for the trial court, and there was substantial evidence supporting its finding that the stock was the husband's separate property. It affirmed, with costs to the husband.